Key Takeaways
- China’s systematic use of forced Uyghur labour in Xinjiang underpins low‑cost exports such as electric‑vehicle (EV) components, aluminium, cotton clothing and processed foods.
- Canada had been strengthening its forced‑labour rules but stalled implementation after a 2023 state visit to China, leading to weakened enforcement and the removal of dedicated staff.
- The United States Trade Representative’s Section 301 investigation found Canada non‑compliant, threatening 10 % tariffs on goods not covered by USMCA unless Ottawa acted.
- Bill C‑35, the new Canadian forced‑labour legislation, will allow the Minister of Foreign Affairs to designate high‑risk products or regions (e.g., Xinjiang‑sourced aluminium, Guangzhou‑made cotton) but falls short of the U.S. presumption‑of‑forced‑labour model.
- Effective enforcement hinges on clear regulations, independent product testing, political will to list risky sectors, and mechanisms for civil‑society input.
- Restoring Global Affairs Canada staff, reinstating customs notices that reference forced‑labour rules, and treating inadequate sourcing disclosures as presumptive evidence of slave labour are essential steps.
- Canadian consumers overwhelmingly reject products made with slave labour; robust legislation and enforcement are needed to align trade policy with those values.
The Scope of Uyghur Forced Labour in Xinjiang
The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region has become synonymous with state‑directed forced labour. Reports from Human Rights Watch, the Uyghur Rights Advocacy Project and other NGOs detail Uyghurs working 12‑hour days, six days a week for as little as $2 an hour, and in more extreme cases, 15‑hour shifts, seven days a week, under armed surveillance with minimal food. These conditions echo the brutal plantation labour of the 18th‑ and 19th‑century American South. The labour feeds a wide range of global supply chains: bauxite mined elsewhere is shipped to Xinjiang to be turned into aluminium by Uyghur slaves; that aluminium then flows to electric‑vehicle factories in Shanghai and elsewhere; Xinjiang cotton ends up in garments stitched in Guangzhou; and Xinjiang‑grown tomatoes appear in sauces and processed foods sold worldwide.
Canada’s Earlier Legislative Momentum and Its Sudden Halt
Until late 2023, Canada was actively tightening its forced‑labour framework. Draft legislation was being written, enforcement units were expanding, and Global Affairs Canada routinely referenced forced‑labour obligations in its Departmental Plan and customs notices. However, a high‑profile state visit to China prompted a rapid reversal: bureaucrats laid down their pens, staff reviewing Xinjiang‑sourced goods were told their positions were being eliminated, and many were reassigned to bolster trade ties with Beijing. Customs guidance that once reminded importers to comply with forced‑labour rules was stripped of those mentions, signalling a deliberate deprioritisation of human‑rights concerns in favour of commercial interests.
The U.S. Section 301 Investigation and Tariff Threat to Canada
The United States Trade Representative (USTR) launched a Section 301 investigation into Canada’s implementation of its forced‑labour prohibitions. The USTR concluded that Ottawa was not adequately enforcing existing laws, which, under U.S. trade policy, justified the threat of a 10 % tariff on Canadian products not covered by the United States‑Mexico‑Canada Agreement (USMCA). This tariff risk was framed by the authors as an “own goal” for Canada: the very policies intended to curb unfair trade practices were weakened, leaving the country vulnerable to punitive U.S. measures. The authors warned the Prime Minister in a March letter that such tariffs were likely unless Canada revived its forced‑labour agenda—a warning that subsequently materialised.
Evidence of Forced‑Labour‑Tainted Imports Entering Canada
Despite clear evidence, Canada has intercepted only two shipments from China under its current forced‑labour regime. In practice, Canadian markets are flooded with goods likely produced with Uyghur slave labour. Electric vehicles from Chinese manufacturers (and even international brands such as Tesla, Toyota, Volkswagen and General Motors that source Chinese‑made components) often contain aluminium processed by Uyghur labourers. Similarly, clothing labelled as “Made in China” frequently incorporates cotton harvested under forced‑labour conditions in Xinjiang, while tomato paste and other processed foods may rely on the same labour pool. The low price of these items is directly tied to the absence of wages for the workers who produce critical inputs, allowing manufacturers to undercut competitors that adhere to labour standards.
Bill C‑35: Canada’s New Forced‑Labour Legislation
In response to the U.S. tariff pressure, Parliament introduced Bill C‑35, which seeks to reinforce Canada’s forced‑labour prohibitions. The bill grants the Minister of Foreign Affairs authority to designate specific products, components, or geographic origins (e.g., “aluminium from Xinjiang” or “cotton from Guangzhou”) where there are reasonable grounds to suspect forced‑labour involvement. Once listed, importers must prove that their goods are not tainted; otherwise, the items can be withheld or refused entry. This approach mirrors the United States’ Withhold Release Orders (WRO) system that preceded the Uyghur Forced Labour Prevention Act. However, Bill C‑35 does not adopt the U.S. model’s presumptive ban: under U.S. law, all goods from the Xinjiang region are presumed to involve forced labour unless importers demonstrate otherwise. Canada’s legislation therefore relies on case‑by‑case listings rather than a sweeping regional presumption, potentially leaving gaps if the government hesitates to add high‑risk categories.
Implementation Challenges and Recommended Actions
The effectiveness of Bill C‑35 will depend on several factors. First, forthcoming regulations must define the threshold for “reasonable grounds” and establish an independent, credible product‑testing regime to verify claims. Second, political will is crucial: the Minister must be willing to list politically sensitive sectors such as EV aluminium or Guangzhou‑based apparel, even if doing so risks diplomatic friction with China. Third, the legislation should incorporate a transparent mechanism for civil‑society organisations, academics and unions to submit evidence that can trigger listings, ensuring that enforcement is not solely reliant on government intelligence. In the interim, the authors urge the immediate reinstatement of the Global Affairs Canada staff positions dedicated to forced‑labour monitoring, the re‑issuance of customs notices that explicitly reference current forced‑labour obligations, and a policy whereby inadequate sourcing disclosures are treated as presumptive evidence of slave labour—triggering automatic refusal or return of the shipment.
Conclusion: Aligning Trade with Canadian Values
Canadians overwhelmingly reject the idea of profiting from slave labour, regardless of how low the price tag may be. The evidence linking Xinjiang‑forced labour to everyday consumer goods—from the aluminium in electric vehicles to the cotton in shirts and the tomatoes in sauces—demands a robust legislative and enforcement response. Bill C‑35 represents a step forward, but its success hinges on clear regulations, bold political choices to list high‑risk industries, and the empowerment of civil society to contribute information. By restoring the bureaucratic capacity that was mistakenly dismantled, reinforcing customs vigilance, and adopting a stance that treats opaque supply chains as suspect, Canada can uphold its international human‑rights commitments, avoid unnecessary tariffs, and ensure that its markets do not become conduits for modern‑day slavery. The time to act is now, lest economic expediency continue to trump moral responsibility.