Key Takeaways
- Jamshid Ghomi, a 63‑year‑old dual citizen residing in Newport Coast, was arrested for allegedly violating U.S. sanctions by exporting American networking and encryption equipment to Iran.
- Prosecutors claim Ghomi operated through his Tehran‑based firm, Faraz Pardaz Rayaneh Co. Ltd., supplying sophisticated technology to Iranian military and nuclear‑related entities for over a decade.
- The scheme allegedly used a Dubai intermediary to conceal the origin of shipments, omitting Ghomi’s name from paperwork and embedding U.S.-origin goods inside larger consignments.
- No required licenses were obtained from the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, breaching the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and Iran Transactions and Sanctions Regulations.
- If convicted, Ghomi faces up to 20 years in prison; the case underscores the U.S. government’s commitment to blocking the illicit flow of controlled technology to adversarial nations.
Arrest of Newport Coast Man
Federal authorities arrested Jamshid Ghomi, 63, of Newport Coast, California, on Wednesday after a criminal complaint accused him of conspiring to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). Ghomi, who holds dual U.S.–Iranian citizenship, is alleged to have spent more than ten years illegally exporting sophisticated American networking, security, and encryption equipment to Iran. The arrest marks a significant step in the Justice Department’s effort to curb the illicit transfer of U.S.‑origin technology to countries subject to comprehensive sanctions, particularly Iran’s military and nuclear sectors.
Description of Faraz Pardaz Rayaneh Co. Ltd.
The complaint identifies Ghomi’s business vehicle as Faraz Pardaz Rayaneh Co. Ltd. (FPR), a Tehran‑based computer networking company. According to the filing, FPR generates over $10 million in annual sales and serves hundreds of Iranian corporate and government clients. Prosecutors contend that FPR acted as the conduit through which Ghomi funneled U.S.-origin technology to end‑users that include the Iranian regime’s military and the government agency responsible for atomic weapons production. The company’s extensive client base and revenue stream underscore the scale of the alleged illicit operation.
Alleged Illegal Export Scheme
Prosecutors allege that Ghomi knowingly violated U.S. sanctions by supplying Iran with controlled technology without obtaining the required export licenses. The complaint states that, for more than a decade, Ghomi arranged the purchase of U.S.-made networking, security, and encryption components and then shipped them to Iran. The equipment is described as “sophisticated,” implying capabilities that could enhance Iran’s communications, cyber defenses, or potentially support nuclear‑related activities. Ghomi’s alleged awareness of the illegality is highlighted by prosecutors, who claim he took deliberate steps to hide his involvement.
Concealment Methods and Dubai Intermediary
To evade detection, Ghomi reportedly used an intermediary based in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, as a transshipment point. The Dubai entity facilitated the movement of goods from the United States to Iran while obscuring the final destination. Ghomi is accused of keeping his name off shipping documents, omitting invoices for Iran‑bound shipments, and embedding U.S.-origin computer equipment inside larger, seemingly innocuous consignments. These tactics were intended to create a paper trail that appeared legitimate and to prevent U.S. authorities from tracing the controlled technology back to him.
Applicable U.S. Sanctions Laws
The core legal basis for the charges is the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), which grants the president authority to regulate commerce in response to unusual and extraordinary threats. Complementing IEEPA, the Iran Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR) prohibit the export, reexport, or transfer of goods, technology, or services to Iran without a specific license from the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). The complaint emphasizes that, during the period Ghomi and FPR conducted their business, no attempt was made to secure the necessary OFAC licenses, thereby constituting a clear violation of both statutes.
Official Statements on the Case
First Assistant U.S. Attorney Bill Essayli characterized Ghomi’s conduct as “aiding our declared enemies by selling U.S.-origin computer networking parts to Iran and earning millions of dollars in violation of U.S. sanction laws.” Acting Special Agent in Charge Darren Lian of the IRS’ Los Angeles field office added that the arrest reflects a commitment to disrupt the illegal flow of American technology to foreign adversaries. Lian noted that Ghomi allegedly exploited U.S. financial systems and procurement channels, using front companies and falsified documentation to move controlled equipment to Iran while concealing his activities.
Possible Sentencing and National Security Impact
If convicted on the conspiracy charge, Ghomi faces a maximum penalty of 20 years in federal prison, alongside potential fines and forfeiture of proceeds derived from the illicit trade. Beyond the individual punishment, the case highlights ongoing vulnerabilities in the global supply chain that sanctions evaders seek to exploit. By targeting networks that facilitate the transfer of dual‑use technology to Iran’s military and nuclear establishments, U.S. authorities aim to protect national security interests and prevent the enhancement of adversary capabilities that could threaten regional stability.
Broader Context and Ongoing Enforcement
The arrest fits within a broader pattern of U.S. enforcement actions aimed at curbing sanctions busting, particularly concerning Iran’s access to advanced technology. Over recent years, multiple indictments have accused individuals and firms of using intermediaries in third countries—such as the UAE, Turkey, and China—to conceal the true end‑users of exported goods. This case serves as a reminder that compliance with export controls and sanctions regimes is not optional; violations carry severe criminal consequences. Authorities continue to monitor and investigate similar schemes, reinforcing the message that attempts to circumvent U.S. sanctions will be met with vigorous prosecution.