Key Takeaways
- Stephen Franks, a senior lawyer, sent a three‑page letter on his firm’s letterhead to 20 health‑care practitioners warning them about providing gender‑affirming care; the letter sparked six complaints to the New Zealand Law Society.
- The Law Society’s Standards Committee found that Franks had used legal process for an improper purpose – to pressure clinicians to stop providing gender‑affirming care – and issued a censure and an undisclosed fine.
- Franks sought a review; the Legal Complaints Review Officer (LCRO) Fraser Goldsmith concluded that sending a lawyer’s letter on behalf of a client does not constitute the misuse of legal process merely because it is authored by a lawyer.
- Goldsmith reversed the Committee’s finding of unsatisfactory conduct, quashed the censure and fine, and noted that such reversals are rare.
- Franks criticized the decision as evidence of the legal profession being “captured” by individuals hostile to free speech and basic professional practice, while the Law Society stressed the independence of its Standards Committees.
- In the 2024/25 year, 1,366 complaints were referred to the Standards Committee, with 89 decisions confirmed, 23 confirmed but modified, and 26 reversed or partially reversed.
Background of the Controversial Letter
In February 2023 Stephen Franks, a veteran barrister with five decades of practice, drafted a three‑page letter on his law firm’s stationery addressed to twenty health‑care professionals. The correspondence warned the recipients that continuing to provide gender‑affirming medical treatments could expose them to legal risk and implicitly threatened litigation if they did not reconsider their practice. Franks framed the letter as a routine client communication intended to convey his client’s concerns about emerging legal developments in the field of gender‑affirming care.
Complaints Lodged with the Law Society
Although none of the twenty clinicians who received the letter filed a complaint, six formal complaints were submitted to the New Zealand Law Society. Two of the complainants were practising lawyers; the remaining four came from other parties. The allegations centred on alleged breaches of professional conduct, including: threatening legal action inappropriately, causing distress to the recipients, failing to exercise independent professional judgment, advancing a controversial political stance, and issuing a letter deemed unprofessional and inconsistent with a lawyer’s duty to uphold professional standards.
Standards Committee’s Initial Findings
The Law Society’s Standards Committee examined the complaints and, in October 2023, dismissed five of the six allegations. However, it upheld the claim that Franks had failed to use legal processes for a proper purpose, citing the rule that a lawyer must not employ or knowingly assist in using the law or legal processes to cause unnecessary embarrassment, distress, or inconvenience to another’s reputation, interests, or occupation. The Committee concluded that the dominant purpose of sending the letter on the firm’s letterhead was to lend weight to an implied threat of litigation aimed at pressuring the health‑care providers to stop offering gender‑affirming care. Consequently, it found Franks’ conduct unsatisfactory, issuing a censure and imposing an undisclosed fine.
Franks’ Response and Request for Review
Franks rejected the Committee’s determination, maintaining that the letter fulfilled his professional obligations to his client and served a legitimate purpose. He applied for a review of the decision, arguing that the correspondence was merely conventional lawyer‑client communication and did not constitute the misuse of legal process. The review was assigned to the Legal Complaints Review Officer (LCRO), Fraser Goldsmith, whose role is to reconsider Standards Committee determinations when a lawyer seeks redress.
LCRO’s Analysis and Reversal
Goldsmith’s review focused on whether the act of sending a lawyer’s letter on behalf of a client inherently amounts to using a legal process for an improper purpose. He concluded that it does not: “The very purpose of a lawyer or firm sending a letter on behalf of a client is, in many if not most instances, to endeavour to lend weight to whatever concern, position or purpose the client seeks to express or advance. That is what lawyers do.” He found no indication that the letter suggested or implied that Franks’ client possessed a right to initiate litigation against the medical practitioners for the stated reason. Consequently, he determined that the Committee’s finding of improper purpose could not stand. Goldsmith reversed the unsatisfactory conduct finding, annulled the censure and fine, and emphasized that such reversals are uncommon, noting he could recall only one other similar instance in his experience.
Franks’ Critique of the Regulatory Environment
Following the reversal, Franks expressed frustration with what he perceives as an overreach of regulatory bodies into core professional freedoms. He characterised the original censure as “stupid” and embarrassing for the legal profession, arguing that it revealed hostility toward basic elements of practice and freedom of speech. Franks lamented that, despite his longstanding service to the Law Society—including convenorship of the company and commercial law committees—no one reached out to apologise or acknowledge the embarrassment the episode caused the profession. He warned that the decision reflected a broader “capture” of professional regulators by individuals inclined to moralise and suppress dissenting viewpoints, comparing them unfavorably to historical figures who would have persecuted perceived heretics.
Law Society’s Position on Process Independence
In response to the public debate, a Law Society spokesperson underscored that Standards Committees operate as independent decision‑making bodies, comprising both lawyers and lay members appointed by the Law Society Board for fixed terms, with a maximum service limit of nine years. The spokesperson highlighted the Committee’s role in impartially evaluating complaints and noted that, during the 2024/25 reporting year, 1,366 complaints were referred for consideration. Of those, 89 decisions were confirmed, 23 were confirmed but modified, and 26 were reversed or partially reversed, illustrating the oversight mechanism’s function in correcting potential errors.
Statistical Context: Complaints and Reviews in 2024/25
The 2024/25 fiscal year saw a substantial volume of professional conduct matters before the Law Society. A total of 1,366 complaints were forwarded to the Standards Committee for review. Simultaneously, the Legal Complaints Review Officer received 165 applications for review of Committee decisions. The outcomes demonstrated the system’s checks and balances: most decisions (89) were upheld as originally rendered, a smaller subset (23) were upheld with modifications, and a notable proportion (26) were overturned or partially overturned—including the Franks case. This data underscores that while the majority of Committee rulings stand, the review process provides an essential avenue for correcting perceived misapplications of professional conduct rules.
Implications for Lawyers and Health‑Care Providers
The Franks episode highlights the tension between zealous advocacy on behalf of a client and the professional obligation to avoid using legal process merely to pressure third parties. It serves as a reminder that lawyers may legitimately convey a client’s concerns via correspondence, but they must be cautious not to imbue such communications with an implicit threat of litigation that could be construed as coercive. For health‑care providers, the case reaffirms their entitlement to continue offering gender‑affirming care based on clinical judgment, absent a lawful basis for legal intimidation. The outcome also signals to regulators that allegations of “improper purpose” must be scrutinised carefully, especially when the underlying conduct involves routine lawyer‑client communication rather than overt legal threats.
Conclusion
The controversy surrounding Stephen Franks’ letter to health‑care practitioners illustrates the complexities inherent in regulating professional conduct within a fiercely debated social arena. While the Standards Committee initially viewed the correspondence as an improper use of legal process aimed at pressuring clinicians, the Legal Complaints Review Officer reversed that conclusion, emphasizing that sending a lawyer’s letter on a client’s behalf is a standard, lawful activity. The episode prompted broader reflections on the balance between protecting professional standards and safeguarding freedom of expression, and it reinforced the importance of independent review mechanisms within the legal profession’s disciplinary framework. Ultimately, the case serves as a cautionary tale for lawyers to ensure their advocacy does not cross into coercive territory, and for regulators to apply their standards with nuance and respect for legitimate client‑lawyer communication.