Key Takeaways
- The Independent relies on reader donations to fund on‑the‑ground reporting on issues ranging from reproductive rights to climate change and to keep its journalism free of paywalls.
- Former NSC official Fiona Hill warns that the United Kingdom’s current contingency plans for major disruptions are “not fit for purpose.”
- The UK lacks a coordinated national resilience strategy, has no single minister responsible for crisis planning, and remains vulnerable to hybrid threats such as cyber attacks, drone strikes, and sabotage of undersea infrastructure.
- Critical gas supplies from Norway (via the Langeled and Vesterled pipelines) and undersea communications cables are identified as high‑risk targets, with Russian surveillance of these assets increasing by roughly 30 % in the past two years.
- The UK’s defence review calls for a “whole‑of‑society” approach, but implementation lags behind European allies like Norway, Sweden and Finland, which have compulsory civil‑defence programmes and decentralised local‑authority planning.
- Ukraine’s model—where mayors and provincial governors coordinate emergency services alongside the military—offers a template the UK could adopt to improve rapid response to drone and missile threats.
- Despite acknowledging the need for stronger air and missile defence, the Ministry of Defence asserts current resources are sufficient, citing recent £1 billion funding uplift tied to the Strategic Defence Review.
The Independent’s Mission and Funding Model
The Independent positions itself as a outlet that sends journalists to the front lines of developing stories, from reproductive‑rights battles to climate‑change investigations and Big Tech scrutiny. It emphasizes that its reporting strives to separate fact from partisan messaging and that it remains accessible to all readers by refusing paywalls, instead relying on contributions from those who can afford to support quality journalism. The appeal underscores that donor support directly enables the newsroom to keep reporters on the ground, giving voice to multiple sides of complex issues.
Fiona Hill’s Assessment of UK Preparedness
Fiona Hill, former director for European and Russian affairs on the National Security Council under Donald Trump, warns that the UK’s current systems for coping with major disruptions are inadequate. In a stark interview with The Independent, she states that the contingencies in place are “not fit for purpose” and urges leadership to devise a comprehensive plan before the next crisis hits. Hill, who also helped author the UK’s 2025 Strategic Defence Review, stresses that the nation’s leadership must act now to close glaring gaps in national resilience.
Fragmented Responsibility and Lack of a Central Authority
A core problem highlighted by Hill is the absence of a single minister or department tasked with national resilience during emergencies. Without a clear chain of command, planning efforts are scattered across ministries, resulting in inadequate preparation for large‑scale disruptions. This institutional vacuum means that when threats materialise—whether cyber, kinetic, or logistical—the response is hampered by confusion and duplicated effort, reducing overall effectiveness.
Hybrid Threats: Cyber, Drones, and Undersea Sabotage
The UK faces a spectrum of hybrid threats that extend beyond traditional military confrontation. Hill points out that soft targets—such as transport hubs, energy facilities, and even the windows of tall buildings—are numerous and difficult to protect against small, weaponised drones. Russia’s Main Directorate for Deep Sea Research (Gugi) has long conducted undersea surveillance, and recent NATO observations revealed Russian Akula‑class submarines and spy boats mapping British undersea cables and pipelines. These operations, which have persisted for decades, aim to incapacitate critical communications and energy links before any overt conflict begins.
Vulnerability of Gas Supplies and Undersea Infrastructure
Approximately 60‑80 % of Britain’s natural gas arrives via the Langeled and Vesterled pipelines from Norway, making them strategic choke points. Hill and fellow expert Dr Sidharth Kaushal warn that any disruption—whether through physical sabotage, cyber intrusion, or naval blockade—could severely impair the UK’s energy security. In tandem, undersea fibre‑optic cables that carry internet and financial traffic are equally exposed, with a noted 30 % rise in Russian surveillance of these assets over the last two years. The lack of digitised maps or analogue backups further compounds the risk if digital navigation or communication systems fail.
Cyber‑Attack Surge and Limited Defensive Capacity
Beyond kinetic threats, the UK endures tens of thousands of cyber attacks daily aimed at critical infrastructure, including power grids, water treatment facilities, and financial networks. Hill and Kaushal argue that the nation’s current cyber‑defence posture lacks the depth and integration needed to sustain prolonged assaults. Without a robust, nationwide cyber‑resilience framework, the UK remains susceptible to cascading failures that could paralyse essential services even before any physical attack occurs.
Strategic Defence Review Recommendations and Implementation Gap
The UK’s 2025 Strategic Defence Review (SDR) advocated a “whole of society” approach to building national resilience, urging collaboration among industry, finance, civil society, academia, education, and local communities. It also called for concrete measures such as stockpiling essential supplies, developing analogue backup systems, and strengthening civil‑defence capacities. However, Lord Robertson, co‑author of the SDR and former NATO secretary‑general, has accused the government of “corrosive complacency,” noting that many of the review’s 62 recommendations remain unimplemented, largely due to political trade‑offs between welfare spending and military investment.
Learning from Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Ukraine
Hill highlights that Nordic countries have long maintained compulsory civil‑defence programmes, regular public‑information campaigns, and decentralised local‑authority planning that enable rapid mobilisation during crises. Ukraine offers another pertinent example: city mayors coordinate emergency services—energy, fire, medical—directly with military early‑warning units, as seen in Kharkiv’s secret bunker where civilian and military planners work side‑by‑side to anticipate drone and missile strikes. The UK lacks an equivalent structure, leaving local responders without clear authority or resources to act decisively when threats emerge.
Expert Consensus on Underinvestment and Political Will
Stephen Arundell, vice chair of the Emergency Planning Society, adds that the UK’s prolonged period of peace has led to underinvestment in resilience measures, making it difficult to pivot quickly when confronted with hybrid warfare. Experts agree that political leaders are reluctant to allocate significant funds for training, equipping, and legislating civil‑defence capabilities, often viewing such expenditures as lower priority compared to immediate welfare or economic concerns. This hesitancy leaves the UK lagging behind its European partners in preparedness.
Government Response: Ministry of Defence’s Position
In response to the critique, the Ministry of Defence asserted that the UK possesses the resources necessary to defend itself against both domestic and foreign threats, emphasising its NATO membership and collective‑defence capabilities. It noted that air and missile defence has become a funding priority after years of neglect, citing a recent commitment of up to £1 billion announced following the Strategic Defence Review to bolster defences and enhance the UK’s contribution to NATO. The MoD maintains that these steps, combined with existing alliance structures, are sufficient to keep the nation secure.
Conclusion: A Call for Integrated National Resilience
The synthesis of warnings from Fiona Hill, Lord Robertson, Dr Kaushal, and other analysts reveals a clear picture: the UK’s current approach to hybrid warfare is fragmented, under‑resourced, and overly reliant on ad‑hoc responses rather than systematic, whole‑of‑society planning. To close the resilience gap, the country would benefit from adopting a model similar to Ukraine’s—empowering local authorities with defined responsibilities, stockpiling essential supplies, developing analogue backups, and instituting compulsory civil‑defence training. Simultaneously, sustained investment in cyber defence, undersea cable protection, and counter‑drone technologies is essential. Without such coordinated action, the UK risks being unprepared for the next wave of hybrid threats that could emanate from a resurgent Russia or other state and non‑state actors. The debate, as Hill urges, must move from acknowledgement to concrete, funded policy before the next crisis unfolds.