Key Takeaways
- The UK government has formally designated Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a threat to national security, making support for the group a criminal offence punishable by up to 14 years’ imprisonment (life for sabotage).
- British‑Iranian journalist Pouria Zeraati, a high‑profile anchor for Iran International, welcomed the move as relief from years of state‑directed intimidation, including a 2024 stabbing attack linked to the IRGC.
- The attack on Zeraati was investigated as a state‑sponsored operation; two Romanian nationals received 12‑ and eight‑year sentences, while a third suspect remains under investigation in Romania.
- The UK’s proscription also covered the shadowy group Islamic Companions of the Right (IMCR), which the government says is almost certainly directed by the IRGC’s Quds Force and has carried out attacks on Jewish‑community targets.
- While the United States, Canada and the European Union have already labelled the IRGC a terrorist organisation, UK officials hesitated due to fears of damaging diplomatic channels with Tehran; the decision is now framed as both a security necessity and a political signal.
- Security experts argue the severe penalties will deter recruitment of petty criminals by state actors, and Zeraati says the designation makes proxies think twice before working for the Iranian regime.
- Zeraati, currently living outside the UK for safety reasons, expressed cautious optimism that the designation will eventually allow him to return and continue his work without fear of trans‑national repression.
Background on Pouria Zeraati and Iran International
Pouria Zeraati is a British‑Iranian journalist who has served as a prominent television anchor for Iran International, a London‑based satellite network that broadcasts criticism of the Islamic Republic and expresses sympathy for the pro‑monarchy opposition in Iran. Because of the network’s editorial line, Zeraati and his colleagues have routinely faced hostile campaigns from Iranian state agents, including billboard depictions labeling him a “child killer” and posters proclaiming “Wanted: Dead or Alive.” The intensity of this pressure forced Iran International to bolster its London studios with concrete barriers and round‑the‑clock armed police presence after credible threats emerged in early 2022. Despite these precautions, the network ultimately suspended its UK operations in 2023 and temporarily relocated to Washington, D.C., while continuing to produce content critical of Tehran.
The UK’s designation of the IRGC as a national security threat
In early October 2025, the UK government announced that it had designated Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a threat to national security, a move fast‑tracked by the outgoing administration of Prime Minister Keir Starmer after approval by both houses of Parliament. The designation places the IRGC on the same legal footing as other UK‑designated terrorist organisations, meaning that providing any form of support or assistance to the group is now a criminal offence. The legislation also stipulates that acts of sabotage carried out on behalf of the IRGC can attract a life sentence. Officials said the step equips law‑enforcement agencies with stronger tools to track, monitor, and counter the IRGC’s influence, which they argue originates in Tehran rather than in the disparate proxies operating across Europe.
Legal consequences of supporting the IRGC
Under the new UK law, anyone found guilty of financing, facilitating, or otherwise assisting the IRGC faces up to 14 years in prison—a penalty mirroring that for supporting recognised terrorist groups. If the support involves planning or executing sabotage, the maximum penalty rises to life imprisonment. The law also criminalises the provision of training, equipment, or intelligence to the IRGC, and it enables authorities to seize assets linked to the organisation. By treating the IRGC as a proscribed entity, the government hopes to deter individuals and networks from acting as intermediaries for Tehran’s overseas operations, thereby reducing the risk of further attacks on UK soil or against UK‑based targets deemed hostile by the Iranian regime.
Details of the 2024 stabbing attack on Zeraati
On a March 2024 afternoon, as Zeraati walked from his south London home toward his car, two men accosted him. One restrained him from behind while the other brandished a knife and stabbed him three times in the thigh. The assailants fled to a waiting vehicle driven by a third accomplice, and the trio promptly left the United Kingdom. Zeraati suffered serious bleeding and required emergency medical treatment. The attack was not a random act of violence; investigators later described it as the culmination of months of surveillance and planning, with at least one suspect having conducted hostile reconnaissance of Zeraati’s property a year earlier. Mobile‑phone records showed repeated contact between the attackers and a third party, and financial analysis indicated that the suspects’ daily expenses were funded through external accounts, suggesting a broader logistical chain.
Investigation and prosecution of the attackers
British prosecutors presented evidence that the assault was state‑sponsored, arguing that the attackers were paid mercenaries acting on behalf of the Iranian regime. In early October 2025, two Romanian nationals—Nandito Badea and George Stana—were sentenced to 12 and eight years’ imprisonment respectively for their roles in the stabbing. The judge concurred with prosecutors that the overwhelming evidence pointed to an operation conducted in Iran’s interests. A third suspect remains in Romania, facing domestic criminal proceedings there, while UK authorities continue to liaise with Romanian law‑enforcement to ensure accountability. The case underscored the UK’s willingness to treat trans‑national repression attempts as serious national‑security matters rather than isolated criminal acts.
Broader pattern of Iranian state‑linked threats in the UK
In the twelve months leading up to October 2025, MI5 identified at least twenty Iran‑linked plots targeting individuals in the United Kingdom, including schemes against Jewish‑community institutions and other perceived opponents of the Tehran regime. These plots, alongside the Zeraati attack, formed part of the governmental rationale for designating the IRGC. The IRGC’s extraterritorial arm, the Quds Force, is known for directing operations against dissidents, journalists, and minority groups abroad. By labelling the entire organisation as a threat, the UK aims to disrupt the flow of resources, intelligence, and personnel that enable such campaigns, thereby protecting not only journalists but also broader civil‑society actors who criticise Iran’s policies.
Proscription of the Islamic Companions of the Right (IMCR)
Concurrent with the IRGC designation, the UK proscribed a previously obscure entity called the Islamic Companions of the Right (IMCR). IMCR had claimed responsibility for a series of attacks on Jewish‑community sites across the UK and Europe, notably an arson strike on four ambulances belonging to the United Hatzalah organisation in London. In communications with CBS News, an administrator of IMCR’s Telegram account boasted that the attack was timed to avoid casualties but warned that the group’s tactics could evolve. The British government now assesses that IMCR is almost certainly directed by members of the IRGC’s Quds Force, linking the group’s violent actions to the state’s broader strategy of employing proxies to intimidate opponents while maintaining plausible deniability.
International context: US, Canada, EU designations and UK diplomatic concerns
The United States first designated the IRGC as a foreign terrorist organisation in 2019, a move later echoed by Canada in 2024 and the European Union in February 2025. The UK’s decision to follow suit had been delayed due to apprehensions within the Foreign Office that proscribing a core pillar of the Iranian state could provoke Tehran into expelling the British ambassador, thereby severing a vital diplomatic channel. The Guardian reported that officials feared such a rupture would hinder negotiations on issues ranging from nuclear non‑proliferation to humanitarian aid. Ultimately, the government concluded that the security imperative outweighed the diplomatic risk, framing the move as both a necessary safeguard for UK citizens and a clear signal to international allies that the UK will not tolerate state‑sponsored intimidation.
Expert and victim perspectives on deterrence and future safety
Neil Basu, former head of UK Counter‑Terrorism Policing, welcomed the designation as a “totemic gesture” that strengthens domestic politics and reassures international partners. He argued that the severe new penalties would deter would‑be recruits from collaborating with the IRGC, transforming what had been a low‑level policing concern into a clear national‑security priority backed by tightly integrated intelligence agencies. Zeraati echoed this sentiment, stating that while the IRGC’s underlying behaviour may not change, the decision makes its proxies reconsider the risks of working for the regime. When asked whether he now feels safe enough to return to the UK, Zeraati expressed cautious optimism: he views the designation as a first step toward a safer environment and said he would return to reside and work in the UK as soon as he perceives the trans‑national repression threat to have diminished.
Zeraati’s outlook on returning to the UK and continued work
Despite continuing to anchor his show from abroad for safety reasons, Zeraati remains committed to the mission of Iran International and to exposing the Iranian regime’s abuses. He believes that the UK’s firm stance against the IRGC will gradually erode the network’s ability to operate covertly against journalists and dissidents in the West. Should the security climate improve, he intends to resume his presence in London studios, confident that the legal tools now available to authorities will better protect him and his colleagues. His experience underscores how targeted sanctions and criminal‑justice measures can serve as both a deterrent against state‑backed violence and a source of hope for those who have endured years of intimidation.