Key Takeaways
- March and March, led by former radio host Jacinta Ngobese‑Zuma, calls for undocumented migrants to leave South Africa by 30 June 2026, a deadline that has sparked violence, displacement and fear across the country.
- Although the movement claims to be apolitical, clear ties exist to Jacob Zuma’s uMkhonto Wesizwe (MK) party: MK treasurer Sanele Khambule is listed as a director of March and March, MK officials have publicly endorsed the anti‑immigrant stance, and MK members have joined its protests.
- Other political actors – ActionSA, the Patriotic Alliance (PA) and, to a lesser extent, the DA – have engaged with March and March, either courting its support or benefiting from its anti‑immigrant rhetoric ahead of local elections.
- Funding for the movement is modest (a BackaBuddy campaign raised ~R13 k of a R20 k goal), but analysts warn that political patronage and logistical support from parties like MK amplify its reach.
- The Government of National Unity (GNU) has responded with increased police presence, immigration raids and a R600‑million SAPS operation, yet critics argue the state is legitimising the vigilante agenda by adopting its narrative and failing to address root causes such as poverty, unemployment and inequality.
- Experts (Professor Loren Landau, Human Rights Watch) contend that xenophobic violence “pays” politically, allowing parties to deflect blame from governance failures while mobilising ethnic‑nationalist bases.
- Civil‑society groups (Siyafana Sonke Action Campaign) demand the cancellation of the 30 June deadline, warning that inaction will lead to further loss of life and deepen the humanitarian crisis.
Background and Objectives of March and March
March and March describes itself as a grassroots movement demanding that all undocumented migrants leave South Africa by a self‑imposed 30 June deadline. Its spokesperson, Jacinta Ngobese‑Zuma, a former radio show host, insists the group is “non‑aligned to any political party” and frames its actions as a lawful call for the state to enforce immigration law. The movement’s rhetoric centers on accusations that foreigners drain public services, take jobs and exacerbate crime, a narrative that has resonated in townships and informal settlements where service delivery is poor.
Political Links to the MK Party
Despite Ngobese‑Zuma’s disclaimer, organisational records show Sanele Khambule, listed as a director and national treasurer of March and March, was a candidate on the MK party’s national election list for the May 2024 general election. Although Khambule did not secure a parliamentary seat, his continued affiliation with MK remains unverified because neither he nor the party responded to requests for clarification. Ngobese‑Zuma cited Sections 18 and 19 of the Constitution (freedom of association and political choice) to defend members’ rights to join any party, yet she avoided answering whether March and March seeks a formal endorsement or coalition with MK ahead of the November 2024 local elections.
MK’s Public Support and Joint Actions
The MK party has repeatedly affirmed its backing of March and March’s anti‑immigrant stance. MK secretary‑general Sibonelo Nomvalo told the Mail & Guardian that the movement stands for “the correct cause” and that MK supports its position against illegal immigration. Joint appearances reinforce this alliance: Nomvalo and Ngobese‑Zuma co‑led a Durban protest against service‑delivery failures, nepotism and corruption, and MK president Jacob Zuma has been seen marching alongside March and March cadres. These interactions suggest a coordinated effort, even if MK denies formal affiliation.
Engagements with Other Political Formations
Beyond MK, March and March has held meetings with ActionSA, the Patriotic Alliance (PA) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). ActionSA leader Herman Mashaba openly praised Ngobese‑Zuma, saying he would “celebrate” if she became the party’s mayoral candidate in eThekwini. In the Eastern Cape, March and March participated in violent protests against a performative Igbo coronation, with ActionSA joining the fray. Ngobese‑Zuma also met DA mayoral candidate Helen Zille for Johannesburg, a meeting that DA leaders described as unauthorized and that left them “fuming.” While the movement denies that such engagements equal alignment, the pattern indicates a strategic courting of multiple parties eager to harness anti‑immigrant sentiment.
Funding and Logistics
Financial transparency remains limited. A BackaBuddy crowdfunding drive amassed R13,167 toward a R20,000 target over six months, with average donations of R200. Ngobese‑Zuma insists the movement receives no direct funding from any political party, including MK. However, analysts warn that in‑kind support—such as venue provision, transportation, and publicity from sympathetic parties—can be as consequential as cash transfers, enabling March and March to mobilise thousands across provinces despite modest monetary contributions.
The 30 June Deadline and Escalating Tension
The looming 30 June deadline has become a flashpoint. Protesters have already disrupted businesses, blocked roads and, in some instances, looted shops owned by foreign nationals. Reports from Gauteng, KwaZulu‑Natal and the Eastern Cape describe intimidation of Johannesburg indicate that thousands of migrants have fled their homes in fear, while others remain, bracing for possible violence. March and March leaders maintain that the protests will be peaceful, yet eyewitness accounts and prior incidents (e.g., the July 2021 unrest) raise concerns that the deadline could trigger another wave of xenophobic attacks.
Government Response and Critiques
In reaction to the mounting crisis, the Presidency announced a R600‑million SAPS operation to bolster border security, increase raids on businesses suspected of employing undocumented workers, and deploy private security firms alongside police. President Cyril Ramaphosa’s 7 June address framed these measures as necessary to uphold law and order. Critics, including Professor Loren Landau and Human Rights Watch researcher Nomathamsanqa Masiko‑Mpaka, argue that the state is effectively outsourcing its security mandate to vigilante groups by adopting their rhetoric and failing to address the structural drivers of migration‑related tension—namely chronic poverty, unemployment and inequality. The lack of arrests for those obstructing migrants’ access to healthcare further fuels perceptions of impunity.
Political Calculus: Who Benefits?
Landau contends that xenophobic violence “pays” politically, allowing opposition parties to claim they have their finger on the electorate’s pulse while deflecting blame from governance failures. The MK party, in particular, stands to gain in eThekwini, where it could become the largest bloc in a fragmented 222‑seat local council, leveraging township and logistics‑worker votes bolstered by its alliance with March and March. Conversely, the ANC and the broader Government of National Unity risk losing credibility, as their inability to manage service delivery and economic woes has opened space for populist, ethno‑nationalist narratives to dominate the political agenda.
Civil‑Society Pushback and Humanitarian Impact
A coalition of 160 civil‑society organisations under the Siyafana Sonke Action Campaign has demanded an urgent meeting with President Ramaphosa, calling for the cancellation of the 30 June deadline and an end to forced removals. They warn that each day of inaction deepens a humanitarian crisis marked by denied healthcare, shuttered spaza shops and families fleeing to neighboring countries. Personal testimonies—such as Malian shop‑owner Musa Mariko, who has lived in Johannesburg since 2006, and Bangladeshi trader Mahtab Abedin, who contemplates returning home—illustrate the human toll of the mounting hostility and the pervasive fear that everyday life could be shattered by violence.
Conclusion: A Nation at a Crossroads
March and March encapsulates a dangerous convergence of populist politics, economic desperation and ethno‑nationalist fervour. While its leaders proclaim apolitical intentions, the movement’s ties to MK, its courting of multiple parties, and the palpable impact on migrant communities reveal a deeply politicised agenda. The state’s response—mixing security escalation with acquiescence to the movement’s framing—risks legitimising vigilante justice rather than addressing the root causes of discontent. As the 30 June deadline approaches, South Africa faces a stark choice: either reinforce inclusive governance and accountability, or allow the politics of fear to dictate the nation’s trajectory. The outcome will shape not only the fate of undocumented migrants but also the health of South Africa’s democratic institutions in the years ahead.