Key Takeaways
- Princy Mthombeni co‑founded and chairs South Africans for Constitutional Reform (SACR), a campaign that publicly framed itself as a citizens‑first effort to curb foreign nationals’ access to healthcare, education, social grants and mineral resources.
- In a separate interview she revealed that her primary motivation for engaging in constitutional reform was to revisit the energy section of the Constitution, specifically to revive the controversial Zuma‑era nuclear deal with Russia’s Rosatom.
- Mthombeni is a long‑standing nuclear advocate: she works as a Stakeholder Relations Officer at the South African Nuclear Energy Corporation (Necsa), has participated in numerous Rosatom‑sponsored events, and leads pro‑nuclear initiatives such as Africa4Nuclear and the South African arm of Stand Up for Nuclear.
- The SACR petition also calls for “oversight of NGOs and NPOs to ensure alignment with national development,” a veiled attempt to curb civil‑society groups that successfully challenged the nuclear deal in court.
- Despite the anti‑immigrant rhetoric, the campaign’s fundraising success—over R500 000 in two weeks via BackaBuddy—was driven largely by small, anonymous donations, with little evidence of foreign coordination or automation.
- Legal analysis indicates that proposals to confine constitutional rights to citizens lack support in current jurisprudence and would require a constitutional supermajority that SACR cannot realistically muster.
- The case illustrates how anti‑foreigner mobilisation can serve as a convenient vehicle for unrelated agendas, in this instance a nuclear‑industry lobby seeking to weaken NGO oversight and revive a Russian‑backed energy project.
The Public Face of SACR: Anti‑Immigrant Constitutional Reform
In May 2025 Princy Mthombeni launched South Africans for Constitutional Reform (SACR), positioning the group as a citizens‑first movement demanding changes to the Constitution’s preamble so that South Africa belongs “to its citizens” rather than “to all who live in it.” The public pitch included restricting foreigners’ access to free healthcare, free education, social grants and reserving mineral resources for South African citizens. These proposals resonated with a growing anti‑immigrant sentiment and helped SACR gather more than 30 000 signatures on its initial petition. The campaign’s rhetoric was amplified through social media, where Mthombeni appeared on eNCA and later posted the interview to her TikTok account, framing the reform as a necessary response to strained public services and perceived unfair advantages for non‑nationals.
From Immigration to Energy: Mthombeni’s Hidden Motivation
Twelve days after the eNCA interview, Mthombeni told YouTuber Penuel Mlotshwa that her true reason for entering the constitutional debate was not immigration at all. She said she wanted “to check the energy sector, or the energy section of the Constitution.” This revelation shifted the focus from foreign nationals to the country’s energy policy, specifically the provision governing nuclear energy. The SACR petition, however, continued to foreground citizenship‑based restrictions, while a lesser‑noted clause near the bottom called for “oversight of NGOs and NPOs to ensure alignment with national development.” The discrepancy between the public narrative and her private statement suggests a strategic use of anti‑immigrant mobilisation to advance a different policy goal.
A Long‑Standing Nuclear Advocate
Mthombeni’s professional background aligns closely with her stated interest in the energy section. She has been a Stakeholder Relations Officer at the South African Nuclear Energy Corporation (Necsa) since March 2007, a role confirmed by Necsa spokesperson Nikelwa Tengimfene. Her LinkedIn profile lists additional consultancy work for the Department of Mineral Resources and Energy (2019‑2022) and highlights her leadership in pro‑nuclear circles: she coordinated the South African arm of the international lobby group Stand Up for Nuclear from 2019 and founded her own platform, Africa4Nuclear, in 2021. Over the years she has attended numerous Rosatom‑sponsored events, including the Atom Expo in Sochi (2022), a media tour of the floating nuclear power plant in Pevek, Russia (2024), and the World Atomic Week in Moscow (2025), where she thanked President Vladimir Putin and Rosatom for covering her travel expenses. These activities reveal a deep entrenchment within the Russian state‑owned nuclear industry’s network.
The Failed Russian Nuclear Deal and NGO Opposition
The nucleus of Mthombeni’s energy‑focused grievance traces back to 2017, when the Western Cape High Court set aside the Zuma administration’s proposed nuclear agreement with Rosatom. The deal, projected to cost roughly R1 trillion, would have locked South Africa into decades of energy dependence on Russia. The court found the process lacked lawful transparency and adequate public participation. Environmental NGOs such as Greenpeace Africa, Earthlife Africa and SAFCEI were the litigants that succeeded in overturning the agreement. Since then, Mthombeni has repeatedly lamented the lost opportunity, claiming on social media that the deal would have provided cheap, reliable, clean baseload power and spurred economic transformation. Her criticism of NGOs frames them as unelected actors undermining democratic mandates—a rhetoric that reappears in SACR’s call for oversight of civil‑society organisations.
SACR’s Petition: Citizenship, Services, and NGO Oversight
While the public narrative emphasized limiting foreigners’ rights, SACR’s formal petition bundled several demands. Besides amending the preamble and curtailing access to healthcare, education, social grants and mineral resources for non‑citizens, it included a broad provision: “Oversight of NGOs and NPOs to ensure alignment with national development.” The wording is intentionally vague, allowing the state to subject any non‑profit organisation deemed misaligned with its development goals to supervision or restriction. This mirrors legislative trends in countries like Russia, where Federal Law 255‑FZ registers and monitors organisations under foreign influence. In the South African context, the NGOs that blocked the nuclear deal are precisely the entities that such oversight would target, revealing a clear link between the anti‑immigrant campaign and the nuclear agenda.
The Anti‑Migrant Mobilisation Climate in South Africa
South Africa is experiencing a pronounced surge in anti‑immigrant activism, aided by digital fundraising platforms. BackaBuddy, the country’s leading crowdfunding site, hosts multiple campaigns aimed at raising money for anti‑immigrant causes, despite its stated prohibition on xenophobic content. SACR’s BackaBuddy page exemplified this trend: the most common donor message was “South Africa for South Africans,” repeated twenty times, while another frequent entry was the isiZulu phrase “abahambe” (“they must leave”). These slogans echo the rhetoric of street‑level movements that openly threaten undocumented migrants, suggesting that SACR’s supporters, although couched in constitutional language, share the same xenophobic undercurrents as more overtly hostile groups.
Funding Success: Half a Million Rand in Two Weeks
SACR’s fundraising outpaced comparable anti‑immigrant initiatives dramatically. While a rival campaign, March and March, had raised only R13 167 of a R20 000 target over ten months, SACR amassed more than R500 000 in just two weeks, with nearly half of that total arriving in four days. The surge began after a TikTok livestream by creator Enhle Njomane on 26 May 2026, which prompted a spike in donations at 9 p.m. and culminated in 1 230 gifts worth R115 738 the following day. An analysis of the donor data (5 427 contributions totalling R525 037) revealed a median gift of R50, a maximum single donation of R5 000, and roughly 39 % anonymity. Foreign‑currency donations were minimal (41 transactions, R12 070 total), and there was no sign of automated or coordinated funding. A single donation accompanied by a Mandarin message translating to “Keep going!” stood out as an oddity but did not indicate illicit foreign backing.
Legal Prospects: Shaky Ground for Constitutional Change
SACR’s ultimate aim—to amend the Constitution—faces substantial legal hurdles. In 2025 the Joint Constitutional Review Committee invited public submissions on possible amendments; SACR’s proposals were among the roughly 1 400 received, of which 348 remained within the committee’s mandate. The committee’s own summary noted that most submissions advocated changing the preamble to limit rights to citizens. However, Parliamentary Legal Services advised that such changes are “not supported by the current constitutional framework or jurisprudence,” pointing out that the Constitutional Court has repeatedly interpreted rights to healthcare, education and social grants as extending to everyone present in the country. Implementing citizen‑only rights would therefore require a constitutional amendment passed by a supermajority—a threshold SACR has no realistic path to achieve. The group’s threat to sue Parliament for ignoring its submission rests on a weak legal foundation, as the committee’s process already deemed many submissions outside its mandate.
Where Will the Money Go? Unclear Beneficiary and Transparency
Despite the impressive haul, the destination of the raised funds remains ambiguous. BackaBuddy classifies SACR’s page as a “Blue Tick” campaign, meaning money is released only to a verified third‑party beneficiary upon submission of an invoice. As of early June 2026, no payout request had been lodged, and BackaBuddy spokesperson Simbulele Jezile clarified that the platform does not monitor, audit or guarantee how beneficiaries spend the money once transferred. Consequently, more than half a million rand sits in limbo, earmarked for a legal challenge whose sponsoring entity and precise objectives have not been disclosed. This opacity raises questions about accountability and the potential for the funds to be diverted toward objectives unrelated to the publicly stated constitutional reform.
The Intersection of Anti‑Foreigner Sentiment and Nuclear Agenda
The evidence points to a strategic layering: SACR’s anti‑immigrant messaging mobilised a receptive audience and generated rapid fundraising, while the underlying motive appears to be the revival of the Russian nuclear deal and the weakening of NGO oversight that blocked it. Mthombeni’s extensive ties to Rosatom, her repeated public lament over the 2017 court decision, and the petition’s vague NGO‑oversight clause collectively suggest a effort to reshape the regulatory environment in favour of state‑backed nuclear projects. The broader pattern—where anti‑foreigner sentiment serves as a low‑cost, high‑yield vehicle for unrelated lobbying—mirrors tactics observed elsewhere, where nationalist rhetoric masks economic or industrial interests. In South Africa’s case, the campaign illustrates how civil‑society organisations that defend transparency and public participation can be recast as impediments to national development, thereby justifying increased state control.
Conclusion: Implications for Democracy and Civil Society
SACR’s episode reveals the vulnerability of democratic processes to issue‑masking. By cloaking a nuclear‑industry agenda in the garb of immigration control, the campaign attracted broad popular support and substantial financial resources, yet its core objectives lack legal viability and threaten to erode the independence of NGOs that have historically acted as watchdogs over state‑led projects. If successful, the push for NGO oversight could diminish civil‑society’s ability to challenge opaque deals, potentially paving the way for projects like the Rosatom nuclear agreement to proceed without rigorous scrutiny. For South Africa’s democratic health, the episode underscores the need for vigilant monitoring of how popular mobilisations are financed and whose interests they truly serve, especially when the rhetoric of citizenship is employed to advance sector‑specific lobbying rather than genuine constitutional reform.