Key Takeaways
- In early 2024, SACP General Secretary Solly Mapaila aggressively lobbied ANC leaders and allies to block any coalition with the Democratic Alliance (DA), framing the DA‑led GNU as a neoliberal conspiracy against the National Democratic Revolution.
- Despite lacking formal negotiating authority, Mapaila mobilised Cosatu, Sanco, and the EFF, but the ANC’s official leadership—Secretary‑General Fikile Mbalula and President Cyril Ramaphosa—pushed a pragmatic GNU that included the DA as the second‑largest partner.
- The GNU survived internal ANC opposition, court challenges, and policy disagreements (especially on foreign policy) because both the ANC and DA recognised the arrangement as essential for national stability and to keep the DA “within the tent.”
- Ramaphosa’s personal stewardship of the GNU has been praised as the glue holding the fragile coalition together, even as he faces criticism from ANC hardliners who view any DA participation as betrayal.
- The looming test for the GNU is the 2026 local‑government elections in Johannesburg, where the DA is projected to lead; Ramaphosa must decide whether to accept a junior role for the ANC or risk further instability by seeking alternative partners.
- Persistent anti‑GNU sentiment within the ANC and its Tripartite Alliance continues to surface, but the leadership argues that the GNU remains a tactical necessity born out of the ANC’s loss of outright power after the 2024 elections.
Mapaila’s Anti‑DA Campaign
During the chaotic winter of 2024, as post‑election coalitions were being negotiated nationally and provincially, South African Communist Party (SACP) General Secretary Solly Mapaila behaved like a desperate addict hunting for a fix. His “drug” was an intense, shared hatred of the Democratic Alliance (DA) that he hoped would stop the ANC leadership from striking any deal with the blue party. Mapaila knocked on the doors of every influential and semi‑influential ANC leader he could find, rallied Cosatu and Sanco comrades, and reached out to potential partners such as the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) and other parties. He acted despite having no mandate to negotiate—authority for such talks resided solely with the ANC’s national leadership elected at the December 2022 conference. On public platforms he railed against the inevitability of a DA‑involved GNU, portraying it as a betrayal of the working class.
The EFF’s Hardline Stance and Zuma’s Influence
At the same time, the EFF—Mapaila’s preferred main coalition partner—was exploiting the ANC’s vulnerability. Though the EFF commanded less than 10 % of the national vote, it demanded heavyweight portfolios, including finance, and insisted on conditions that the ANC deemed impossible. Meanwhile, Jacob Zuma’s party, which some ANC figures advocated as a partner alongside the EFF, pushed for the ANC to drop President Cyril Ramaphosa as its presidential candidate. These competing pressures created a volatile environment where Mapaila’s anti‑DA crusade collided with the EFF’s maximalist demands and Zuma‑aligned calls for leadership change.
Mbalula’s Pragmatic GNU Construction
While Mapaila and his allies chased an impossible ideal, ANC Secretary‑General Fikile Mbalula’s official team assembled a more realistic deal. Their putative agreement, featuring the DA as the second‑most important player in a ten‑party Statement of Intent, became the focal point of SACP outrage. The SACP denounced the GNU as a construct of “right‑wing, DA‑led anti‑ANC neoliberal forces,” claiming it was backed by dominant sections of capital—particularly the white bourgeoisie rooted in colonial and apartheid oppression—and supported by Western foundations. In the SACP’s view, the Multi‑Party Charter, initially driven by the DA but later broadened, represented a neoliberal conspiracy aimed at capturing the ANC and derailing the National Democratic Revolution. Mapaila labelled the GNU the “highest form of betrayal of our people” and continued to mobilise against it within the ANC, even after failing to scupper its composition.
ANC Internal Reactions and the NGC Verdict
The GNU was never popular inside ANC ranks, giving Mapaila ample sympathetic ears. Nevertheless, the deal was shepherded through by President Cyril Ramaphosa and Mbalula, who endured both private and public abuse for their efforts. The GNU’s survival thus far testifies to the maturity of leaders from both parties and the stark reality that each side needs the arrangement for stability. Several crises have tested the pact: the DA’s repeated court challenges to legislation rammed through by the ANC in its final days as a parliamentary majority, and stark divergences over foreign policy—where the DA wants a GNU‑shaped stance while the ANC clings to longstanding liberation‑movement positions. The most significant hurdle was securing approval at the ANC’s National General Council (NGC) in December 2025. After intense agitation for a revisitation, the NGC’s top seven leaders and other National Executive Committee (NEC) operators calmed the dissent and steered the conversation away from exiting the GNU. The final declaration deemed the pact an unavoidable “tactical intervention” necessary for national unity, stability, and for keeping the DA “within the tent.”
Ramaphosa as the GNU’s Glue
President Cyril Ramaphosa has emerged as the essential glue holding the fragile coalition together. Although critics accuse him of serving big capital, his management of the GNU has been praised for its perseverance amid DA petulance. Ramaphosa insists that the original motivations for the GNU—mutual need for stability and the containment of the DA—remain valid, reminding observers that the partners remain distinct parties with different policies, ideologies, histories, and are fundamentally contestants. He acknowledges that silencing anti‑GNU sentiment is the easier part; the real test lies ahead as he must lead the ANC into metro, secondary‑city, and town‑government negotiations, where many municipalities are in precarious shape due to ANC misgovernance and corruption. In such settings, provincial and regional leaders may be tempted to strike dubious deals with opportunists, and national bosses may indulge them to retain power.
Johannesburg: The Ultimate Test
The looming showdown will be Johannesburg, South Africa’s economic engine. The city has teetered on the brink of financial and infrastructural collapse for years, reinforcing the adage: “If Joburg fails, SA pays.” Over the past eight years of fluid local politics, ANC networks—political, business, and labour—have shown a strong aversion to losing power, especially in metropolitans. In 2024, Gauteng ANC leadership defied Luthuli House and rejected a DA deal when demands made by Panyaza Lesufi and his team were judged as untenable, echoing the EFF’s national‑level stance. Hardened attitudes persist; most polls place the DA ahead of the ANC in Johannesburg, though some give the ANC a marginal edge. If the DA emerges as the largest party, Ramaphosa faces a dilemma: can he compel his provincial and regional lords to accept a secondary role in a DA‑led government? Sharing power with an in‑charge Helen Zille would be a far more complex proposition than the ANC’s past experience of playing second fiddle to smaller parties like Al Jama‑ah. Conversely, if the ANC narrowly wins, will it replicate the national GNU model locally for the sake of stability, or will provincial leaders dig in, forcing Ramaphosa to gamble his final year as ANC president on an unpopular coalition decision? Alternative partners such as ActionSA, the IFP, and smaller parties exist, but none appear sufficient to push the ANC past the 50 % threshold on their own. National leaders have hinted that the “blue pill”—accepting DA participation—may be unavoidable, with its consequences to be dealt with later.
Continuing Anti‑GNU Sentiment and Outlook
Despite the GNU’s endurance, opposition within the ANC and its Tripartite Alliance has never truly vanished. Recent Cosatu congress resolutions reaffirmed the rejection of a GNU inclusive of right‑wing parties and their neoliberal austerity agenda. Pre‑congress documents alleged that the ANC leadership negotiated clandestine deals with the DA behind the backs of Alliance partners, labelling the DA an anti‑worker, anti‑poor, white‑supremacist organisation funded by capital. After the ANC’s Constitutional Court victory over the IEC regarding candidate deadlines, Mbalula hinted that the DA’s participation in the GNU could be reviewed, noting that Parliament is large enough to find other partners and that nothing binds the ANC forever to the DA. ANC Youth League president Collen Malatji echoed calls for Ramaphosa to dismiss all DA ministers. This persistent pressure underlines that the GNU remains a contested compromise, tolerated chiefly because both major parties perceive it as the lesser evil compared to the prospect of renewed instability or total power loss. As the 2026 local elections approach, the true test will be whether Ramaphosa can maintain the delicate balance that has kept the GNU alive thus far, or whether rising ANC hardliners will succeed in pushing the DA out—risking the very stability the GNU was designed to preserve.