Key Takeaways
- Dr Mark Shaw urged the Madlanga commission to create an organised crime council as an immediate, short‑term intervention.
- South Africa ranks among the top ten countries worldwide affected by organised crime, highlighting the urgency of action.
- The council would be formed by ministerial directive, financed from the police ministry’s existing budget, and include a broad range of stakeholders (civil society, academia, business, labour, and affected communities).
- Its five core functions are to build political support and monitor implementation, provide a stakeholder platform for policy discussion, advise the police minister on national strategy, oversee the police and prosecutorial response to institutional infiltration, and help implement the commission’s recommendations pending legislation.
- Shaw also recommended criminalising unexplained wealth held by public officials to dismantle a key incentive for criminal infiltration of state institutions.
Background of the Madlanga Commission
The Madlanga commission of inquiry was established to investigate allegations of criminality, political interference, and corruption within South Africa’s criminal justice system. Over recent months the commission has heard testimony describing how criminal cartels have penetrated police stations, prosecutorial offices, and even municipal administrations in cities such as Tshwane and Ekurhuleni. Its mandate is to uncover the mechanisms that allow organised crime to infiltrate public institutions and to propose reforms that safeguard the integrity of the justice system. The commission’s work is expected to culminate in a final report to be presented to President Cyril Ramaphosa in November, after which remedial legislation may follow.
South Africa’s Organised Crime Landscape
Dr Mark Shaw, an internationally recognised expert on policing, illicit markets and organised crime with three decades of research experience, informed the commission that South Africa currently ranks in the top ten among 195 nations affected by organised crime. He stressed that the scale and sophistication of criminal networks pose a pressing threat not only to public safety but also to the legitimacy of state institutions. Shaw warned that without decisive action, the infiltration of the criminal justice system will continue to erode trust and undermine the rule of law.
Proposal for an Organised Crime Council
In response to the commission’s inquiry, Shaw recommended the establishment of an organised crime council as a short‑term intervention. He argued that such a body would provide the necessary coordination and strategic direction to combat organised crime effectively. The council would be created through a ministerial directive issued by the police minister, thereby avoiding lengthy legislative processes while still carrying official authority.
Structure and Funding of the Council
Shaw advised that the council be financed exclusively from the police ministry’s existing budget, ensuring that no new fiscal burdens are imposed on the state. Its membership should be deliberately broad, encompassing civil society organisations focused on policing and governance, independent academics and research bodies, representatives of business and organised labour, and, crucially, communities that experience organised crime on a daily basis. This inclusive composition is intended to bring diverse perspectives and grassroots insights to the policy‑making process.
Function 1: Building Political Support and Monitoring Implementation
The first key function of the proposed council would be to build political support across government and civil society for the state’s response to organised crime and to monitor the implementation of that response. By fostering consensus among ministries, legislature, and civil society actors, the council could help sustain momentum for anti‑crime initiatives and ensure that promised actions are translated into concrete results on the ground.
Function 2: Stakeholder Platform for Policy Discussion
Second, the council would serve as a platform for stakeholders outside government—including civil society organisations, businesses, academia, and affected communities—to participate in policy discussions on organised crime. Through regular consultations and working groups, these actors could contribute practical, community‑level measures and share intelligence that enriches national strategy while reinforcing ownership of the anti‑crime agenda.
Function 3: Advising the Police Minister
Third, the council would advise the police minister on the implementation of a national organised crime strategy, as well as on broader policy matters relating to the evolving threat and scale of organised crime in the country. Its recommendations would be grounded in research and analysis supplied by independent experts, thereby ensuring that policy decisions are evidence‑based and responsive to emerging trends.
Function 4: Overseeing Police and Prosecutorial Response to Institutional Infiltration
Fourth, Shaw proposed that the council oversee the police and prosecutorial response to the infiltration of public institutions by organised crime. The body would monitor investigations, assess the effectiveness of internal safeguards, and report its findings to the minister. This oversight function aims to detect and dismantle corrupt networks that seek to exploit law‑enforcement and judicial organs for criminal gain.
Function 5: Implementing the Commission’s Recommendations
Finally, the council would help implement the Madlanga commission’s recommendations during the interim period between the release of its final report and the introduction of remedial legislation. By translating the commission’s findings into actionable plans, the council would bridge the gap between inquiry and reform, preventing loss of momentum and ensuring that key lessons are acted upon swiftly.
Additional Recommendation: Criminalising Unexplained Wealth
Beyond the council, Shaw urged the commission to recommend that parliament create a specific criminal offence targeting unexplained wealth held by public officials. Such a provision would empower investigators to probe assets that cannot be justified by legitimate income, thereby deterring corrupt enrichment and facilitating the recovery of illicit gains. This measure complements the council’s oversight role by directly addressing one of the primary incentives for criminal infiltration of state institutions.
Conclusion and Timeline
The Madlanga commission is scheduled to deliver its final report to President Cyril Ramaphosa in November. Following the report, the anticipated remedial legislation will be drafted and debated in parliament. If adopted, Shaw’s proposals—particularly the organised crime council and the unexplained wealth offence—could become cornerstones of a renewed national effort to dismantle criminal networks, protect public institutions, and restore public confidence in South Africa’s justice system.