Key Takeaways
- The U.S. Air Force issued a Request for Information (RFI) seeking industry partners that can supply a Ground‑Based Launcher (GBL) system to protect its installations from cruise missiles and unmanned aerial systems (UAS).
- Responses are due August 6; the RFI calls for a system capable of engaging Group 1‑5 drones (from sub‑21 lb “kamikaze” UAVs up to Global Hawk‑sized platforms) and cruise missiles.
- Desired attributes include a high firing rate, deep magazine capacity, seamless command‑and‑control (C2) integration, laser‑illuminator fire control, and built‑in sensing for target acquisition.
- The system must be transportable, self‑contained, low‑manpower, and incorporate built‑in testing diagnostics for maintenance and safety.
- Cost, transportability, and ease of sustainment are listed among the 11 “critical baseline attributes.”
- The RFI references Joint Publication JP 3‑01 (Countering Air and Missile Threats) as the doctrinal foundation.
- The initiative follows a surge of Iranian drone and missile attacks on U.S. and allied bases in the Middle East—including the loss of an E‑3 Sentry AWACS and damage to KC‑135 tankers—and parallels the high‑intensity drone/missile warfare seen in the Russia‑Ukraine conflict.
- Internally, Air Force strategists have argued that the service should reduce reliance on the Army for airfield air defense, noting that expeditionary bases often lack sophisticated Army systems like Patriot and that Air Force security forces are presently under‑equipped for the air‑defense mission.
The U.S. Air Force is actively seeking industry partners capable of delivering a Ground‑Based Launcher (GBL) solution to shield its installations from the growing threat of cruise missiles and unmanned aerial systems. The service released a Request for Information (RFI) with a response deadline of August 6, inviting vendors to outline how their proposed systems would meet a broad set of operational and logistical requirements.
At the core of the RFI is the need for a weapon system that can engage both cruise missiles and drones across the entire spectrum of UAS sizes. Specifically, the Air Force expects the GBL to counter Group 1 drones (maximum gross takeoff weight under 21 lb) through Group 5 drones (over 1,320 lb), effectively covering everything from small, inexpensive loitering munitions to large, high‑altitude platforms comparable to the RQ‑4 Global Hawk. In addition to drone interception, the system must be capable of neutralizing incoming cruise missiles, providing a layered defense against the mixed threat environment observed in recent conflicts.
To sustain a robust defensive posture, the Air Force emphasizes high firing rates and deep magazine capacity. Vendors are asked to detail the operational performance metrics of their launchers, including the rate of fire across all magazines and the total number of interceptors available before reloading. This focus on ammunition depth reflects lessons learned from the Middle East, where Iranian drone and missile salvos have overwhelmed existing defenses, and from the Russia‑Ukraine war, where continuous waves of UAVs and missiles have depleted interceptor stockpiles.
Integration with existing battle‑management networks is another priority. The RFI calls for seamless command‑and‑control (C2) system integration, enabling rapid dissemination of sensor data and timely weapons cueing. A laser illuminator for fire control is specified, suggesting a preference for precision‑guided interceptors that can rely on laser designation for accurate targeting. Furthermore, the system should possess integrated sensing capabilities—likely radar, electro‑optical/infrared, or a combination—to detect, track, and classify threats autonomously or with minimal operator intervention.
Logistical and sustainment considerations are captured in the RFI’s list of 11 critical baseline attributes. These include cost-effectiveness, transportability (the ability to move the system quickly between austere locations), low manpower requirements, and built‑in testing diagnostics to support maintenance and safety checks. The Air Force wants a solution that can be deployed rapidly to expeditionary airbases without imposing a heavy logistics footprint or requiring large crews to operate and maintain it.
The RFI also points contractors to Joint Publication JP 3‑01, “Countering Air and Missile Threats,” as the doctrinal baseline for developing the GBL concept. This reference underscores the Air Force’s desire to align the new system with established joint counter‑air and missile defense principles while tailoring it to the specific needs of airfield protection.
The impetus for this initiative stems from a series of high‑profile attacks on U.S. and allied forces. In the Middle East, Iranian‑launched drones and missiles have destroyed a valuable E‑3 Sentry AWACS aircraft, damaged multiple KC‑135 tankers at Saudi bases, and crippled several air defense radars. Simultaneously, the ongoing Russia‑Ukraine conflict has demonstrated how massed drone and missile barrages can strain even sophisticated air defense networks, highlighting the necessity for ample interceptor stocks and rapid engagement cycles.
Internally, Air Force leaders have debated the current division of labor for airfield defense. A recent Air Staff memorandum argued that the Air Force should reduce its reliance on the Army for primary air defense of air bases, contending that expeditionary locations often lack the Army’s advanced systems (e.g., Patriot) and that Air Force security forces are presently under‑equipped to counter aerial threats effectively. The GBL RFI can be seen as a concrete step toward achieving a more independent, organic air defense capability for the Air Force, ensuring that its installations can protect themselves against the evolving cruise‑missile and drone threat without depending on external services.