Key Takeaways
- The Golden State Warriors pursued a “two timelines” roster plan under former GM Bob Myers, aiming to keep a veteran core (Curry, Green, Thompson) while simultaneously developing a younger group (Wiseman, Kuminga, Moody).
- Myers defended the strategy on a 2023 podcast, citing the desire to draft high‑upside players like Tracy McGrady or Kobe Bryant, even if they carried risk.
- The approach largely failed: James Wiseman never lived up to his lottery pick, Jonathan Kuminga struggled to fit the Warriors’ system, and Moses Moody has remained only a solid role player.
- Drafting high‑upside prospects instead of high‑floor contributors left coach Steve Kerr without ready‑made support for the star‑driven offense, straining player‑coach relationships.
- The Warriors have recently shifted toward a high‑floor mindset, exemplified by the selection of Yaxel Lendeborg—a 24‑year‑old with collegiate experience who can contribute immediately.
- Although Myers deserves credit for building the championship teams, the “two timelines” experiment is viewed as a missed opportunity that may have cost the franchise additional titles as the core ages.
The Golden State Warriors’ rise to dominance in the mid‑2010s was built around a trio of elite shooters and defenders—Stephen Curry, Klay Thompson, and Draymond Green—whose synergistic play redefined modern basketball. As that core began to age, former general manager Bob Myers attempted to chart a future that would both preserve the championship window and inject new talent. His solution was the so‑called “two timelines” approach: maintain a veteran half of the roster capable of competing now, while simultaneously developing a younger half destined to take over when the stars eventually declined.
Myers publicly defended the philosophy on Tom Tolbert’s podcast in October 2023. He acknowledged that some fans, media figures, and even internal voices wanted the team to draft players who were “more ready to play.” However, he argued that selecting high‑upside prospects—players with the potential to become the next Tracy McGrady or Kobe Bryant—was worth the risk, especially when the Warriors held high lottery picks. Myers insisted that, even with hindsight, he would not have altered those decisions.
In practice, the two‑timeline plan produced disappointing results. James Wiseman, the second overall pick in the 2020 draft, failed to develop into the defensive anchor or offensive contributor the Warriors envisioned; injuries, limited skill translation, and a lack of fit with the team’s pace‑and‑space offense relegated him to a marginal role. Jonathan Kuminga, selected seventh overall in 2021, showed flashes of athleticism and scoring ability but never adapted to the Warriors’ sophisticated, motion‑based system. His inconsistent decision‑making and defensive lapses created friction with head coach Steve Kerr, whose relationship with the young forward became a recurring subplot during the 2022‑23 season. Moses Moody, taken 14th in 2021, has carved out a respectable niche as a three‑and‑D role player, yet he has not approached the All‑Star caliber many hoped for when the franchise invested a top‑15 pick in him.
Critics argue that the fundamental flaw lay in prioritizing upside over immediate utility. The Warriors’ offensive identity—quick ball movement, relentless spacing, and elite shooting—requires players who can read and execute the system almost instantly. By drafting prospects who needed extensive development, Myers left Kerr with a roster that often lacked reliable backup options, forcing the starters to shoulder heavier minutes and increasing injury risk. The mismatch also hindered the team’s ability to absorb the inevitable decline of Curry, Thompson, and Green, as the younger pieces were not yet capable of maintaining the high level of play required to stay competitive.
Recognizing the misstep, the Warriors have pivoted toward a high‑floor strategy in recent drafts. The selection of Yaxel Lendeborg—an older, college‑tested forward who can step into the rotation right away—illustrates this new philosophy. Lendeborg’s readiness to contribute defensively and his familiarity with structured offensive schemes make him a far better fit for the Warriors’ current needs than the high‑risk, high‑reward projects of previous years.
While this adjustment may help sustain competitiveness in the short term, many analysts contend that the window for adding another championship to the Warriors’ résumé has already narrowed. The core is now in its early thirties, and the accumulated wear from years of deep playoff runs makes it increasingly difficult to rely solely on veteran excellence. Had the franchise embraced a high‑floor approach earlier—either by drafting ready‑made contributors or by trading those lottery picks for established role players—the Warriors might have extended their dynasty and potentially secured additional titles.
Bob Myers will always be remembered for his role in assembling the championship teams that defined an era. Yet, the “two timelines” experiment stands as a cautionary tale about the perils of valuing potential over practical fit, especially for a franchise built on a precise, system‑dependent style of play. The lesson, now being applied with players like Lendeborg, may help the Warriors remain relevant, but the opportunity to maximize their historic run may have already slipped away.