Key Takeaways
- Non‑profit cybersecurity organisations deliver essential public‑interest functions—threat intelligence sharing, incident‑response coordination, standards development, capacity‑building, and support for vulnerable communities—that governments and commercial providers cannot fully supply on their own.
- These organisations help close the widening cyber‑resilience gap between large enterprises and small‑and‑medium‑sized enterprises (SMEs) by offering affordable expertise and services.
- A counterfactual analysis shows that replacing their work with commercial alternatives would cost hundreds of millions of dollars, while the harms they prevent amount to billions in avoided losses.
- The infrastructure and coordination mechanisms they sustain underpin global economic activity worth hundreds of billions of dollars.
- Continued underfunding threatens critical cyber‑resilience functions worldwide; the report urges dedicated multi‑year government funding, formal integration into national cybersecurity strategies, rapid‑response crisis funds, and industry‑wide financial support norms.
Introduction to the HCSS Report
The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) released a new report authored by Hans Horan, Ron Stoop, and Jan Feldhusen that examines the role of non‑profit cybersecurity organisations within the global cyber ecosystem. The study argues that these entities are not peripheral charities but core providers of public‑interest security that keep the digital world functioning safely and resiliently. By mapping their activities and estimating the economic value they generate, the report highlights a systemic under‑recognition and underfunding that jeopardises worldwide cyber resilience.
Core Functions of Non‑Profit Cybersecurity Actors
According to the findings, non‑profit cybersecurity organisations perform five essential functions: (1) sharing threat intelligence across sectors and borders, (2) coordinating incident response during large‑scale cyber events, (3) developing and maintaining open standards and best practices, (4) building capacity through training and technical assistance for under‑resourced entities, and (5) offering direct support to vulnerable communities such as hospitals, schools, and civil‑society groups. These activities collectively reduce harm, strengthen resilience, and sustain the shared digital infrastructure that underpins the global economy.
Addressing the Cyber‑Resilience Gap
The report notes a growing disparity in cyber‑resilience capabilities between large organisations and small‑and‑medium‑sized enterprises (SMEs). While big firms can afford sophisticated defences, many SMEs lack the budget and staffing to implement basic security measures. Non‑profit organisations bridge this divide by delivering low‑cost or free services—such as vulnerability assessments, malware analysis, and security awareness training—that would otherwise be inaccessible to smaller players, thereby levelling the playing field.
Economic Valuation via Counterfactual Analysis
Using a counterfactual methodology, the authors estimate that substituting the services provided by non‑profit cybersecurity groups with commercial equivalents would require hundreds of millions of dollars in additional spending. Conversely, the cyber‑harms they help avert—data breaches, ransomware attacks, and service disruptions—translate into billions of dollars in avoided losses. Moreover, the trust and stability they foster in shared protocols and infrastructure underpin economic activity valued at hundreds of billions of dollars worldwide.
Testimonial Insight from Lead Author Hans Horan
Hans Horan emphasises that non‑profit cybersecurity organisations should be viewed as “highly effective providers of public‑interest security” rather than charitable afterthoughts. He argues that their work is integral to the safe operation of the global digital ecosystem, enabling businesses, governments, and citizens to rely on a resilient cyber environment. This perspective shifts the policy conversation from questioning their relevance to recognising them as indispensable components of national and international security architectures.
Policy Recommendations for Sustainable Support
To counteract the risks of chronic underfunding, the report proposes several concrete measures. Governments should establish dedicated, multi‑year funding streams earmarked for non‑profit cybersecurity initiatives, formally embed these organisations into national cybersecurity strategies, and create rapid‑response financing mechanisms that can be activated during major cyber crises. Additionally, the study calls on private‑sector actors to adopt standing norms for financial contributions—such as industry‑wide levies or voluntary pledges—to ensure a steady and predictable resource base for the sector.
Perspective from Co‑Author Ron Stoop
Ron Stoop frames the policy dilemma succinctly: “The policy question is no longer whether these organisations matter, but whether a robust and equitable cybersecurity system remains possible without them.” This statement underscores that the existence of a fair, resilient cyber landscape hinges on the continued operation and support of non‑profit cybersecurity actors. Without them, the report warns, critical functions such as open‑source threat sharing and community‑focused incident response could erode, leaving gaps that malicious actors could exploit.
Assurance and Attribution Details
The research underwent quality assurance by Paul Sinning and was commissioned by the Common Good Cyber initiative, with execution carried out by the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS). Responsibility for the content and expressed opinions rests solely with the authors—Hans Horan, Ron Stoop, and Jan Feldhusen—ensuring academic independence and transparency in the analysis and recommendations presented.