Key Takeaways
- Army Gen. Joshua Rudd, the new head of U.S. Cyber Command and NSA, has ordered two simultaneous reviews to accelerate modernization of the cyber warfighting arm.
- MITRE, a nonprofit research organization, will conduct an external study whose scope is still undefined but is expected to focus on acquisition models and the “service‑like authorities” that let Cyber Command manage personnel without being an independent service.
- An internal “confederation” of senior leaders with special‑operations backgrounds is performing a parallel look‑for‑quick‑wins study, which one official described as yielding little substantive insight.
- The reviews are intended to feed into Rudd’s 90‑day assessment, a standard practice for newly appointed combatant commanders, and are expected to be completed next month.
- Officials say the timing reflects Rudd’s recognition of his limited cyber‑specific background and the urgency to align Cyber Command with President Trump’s more confrontational cyberspace posture.
- The ongoing CYBERCOM 2.0 force‑generation strategy—including the planned Cyber Innovation Warfare Center—may overlap with MITRE’s acquisition focus, though officials argue the work will be complementary.
- Skeptics warn that outside evaluations could divert attention from core CYBERCOM 2.0 pillars, while supporters believe the dual‑track approach will give Rudd a broader information base for decision‑making.
Introduction
In March, Army Gen. Joshua Rudd assumed the dual leadership of U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency, inheriting a organization that has struggled to keep pace with rapid technological change and evolving threat landscapes. Recognizing the need for swift action, Rudd promptly commissioned two separate studies—one external, conducted by the nonprofit research firm MITRE, and one internal, led by a group of senior officers with special‑operations experience—to examine how Cyber Command might better modernize its structures, processes, and capabilities.
MITRE Study Scope and Expectations
The MITRE evaluation, whose precise parameters remain undefined, is anticipated to scrutinize Cyber Command’s acquisition model. Analysts suggest the review will also examine the so‑called “service‑like authorities” granted by Congress that permit the command to recruit, train, and equip personnel without constituting an independent military branch. As a longstanding supporter of federal cybersecurity initiatives, MITRE is expected to deliver findings that will be folded into Rudd’s 90‑day review, a customary step for newly appointed combatant commanders seeking an evidence‑based baseline for reform. The study is slated for completion next month.
Internal Special‑Operations Confederation Review
Parallel to the MITRE effort, Rudd convened a “confederation” of senior Cyber Command leaders who possess backgrounds in special operations. This internal team was tasked with identifying “quick wins”—low‑hanging fruit that could be implemented rapidly to improve operational effectiveness. According to a command official who spoke on background, the exercise yielded limited substantive outcomes, being described colloquially as “a big nothingburger.” Nevertheless, the initiative reflects Rudd’s desire to harness the unconventional thinking and agility often associated with special‑operations communities.
Context of Rudd’s Limited Experience and Timing
Current and former defense officials note that the dual‑track review strategy signals Rudd’s awareness of his relatively shallow background in cyber‑specific matters compared with his predecessors, who typically rose through the ranks of the cyber force. The timing is also noteworthy because previous Cyber Command chiefs generally arrived with preset agendas and only later solicited external input to refine ideas or uncover efficiencies. Rudd’s approach—launching both studies simultaneously—aims to compress the learning curve and obtain a broader perspective early in his tenure. A former senior cyber official characterized the move as a “decent idea,” arguing that the more varied information and opinions Rudd collects, the better equipped he will be to make informed decisions.
CYBERCOM 2.0 and the Cyber Innovation Warfare Center
The reviews unfold amid the Pentagon’s broader CYBERCOM 2.0 force‑generation strategy, which was initially approved under the Biden administration and subsequently revised and accelerated during the Trump presidency. A cornerstone of CYBERCOM 2.0 is the establishment of a Cyber Innovation Warfare Center designed to emulate rapid‑acquisition offices found elsewhere in the Department of Defense. This center is intended to speed the development, acquisition, and fielding of cutting‑edge cyber capabilities by fostering closer collaboration with industry and academia. Gen. Rudd highlighted the initiative’s progress in recent Senate testimony, noting that the program is “moving at pace and achieving new milestones each month” and that it will enhance the command’s ability to work with external partners.
Criticisms and Overlap Concerns
Some observers have expressed concern that MITRE’s focus on acquisition could duplicate or overshadow elements of the CYBERCOM 2.0 blueprint, particularly the planned Innovation Warfare Center. A command official pushed back against the notion of redundancy, conceding only that “there’s some overlap with what MITRE is doing on acquisition,” while maintaining that the MITRE work would be “complimentary” to the 2.0 strategy. The official added that, if scoped appropriately, the study could yield valuable recommendations without derailing existing efforts. Nonetheless, the debate underscores a tension between pursuing external expertise and preserving continuity in ongoing reform initiatives.
Official Statements and Future Outlook
Both Cyber Command and MITRE declined to comment publicly on the specifics of the studies, leaving many details to speculation. The command official who spoke anonymously predicted that there would likely be no further outside evaluations in the foreseeable future, suggesting that Rudd intends to rely on the combined insights from the MITRE review, the internal special‑operations confederation, and his own 90‑day assessment to shape the command’s direction. Former officials have advised that bringing in a cadre of senior or retired “grey beards” with deep cyber experience could provide Rudd with contextual understanding of legacy decisions, potential pitfalls, and where to focus his reform energy—a suggestion that, as of now, has not been acted upon.
Conclusion
Gen. Joshua Rudd’s decision to launch concurrent external and internal reviews reflects a pragmatic attempt to accelerate modernization at U.S. Cyber Command amid leadership transition, limited personal cyber expertise, and heightened strategic pressure to adopt a more confrontational cyberspace posture. While the MITRE study will likely examine acquisition processes and service‑like authorities, the internal special‑operations confederation seeks rapid, actionable improvements. Both efforts are set to inform Rudd’s 90‑day assessment and intersect with the ongoing CYBERCOM 2.0 initiative, particularly the proposed Cyber Innovation Warfare Center. The ultimate success of this dual‑track approach will hinge on how well the command integrates diverse recommendations without losing sight of its core objectives, and whether Rudd can leverage the breadth of input to build a more agile, effective cyber warfighting force.