DevMan RaaS Portal: Unified Platform for Payload Builds, Victim Management, and Affiliate Payouts

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Key Takeaways

  • DevMan operates a ransomware‑as‑a‑service (RaaS) platform that lets affiliates generate payloads, track earnings, manage victims, and receive support.
  • The service originated in April 2025 as an affiliate for several established groups before launching its own RaaS, with code lineage traced to DragonForce.
  • Affiliate activities are tightly governed: a curator assigns newcomers, monitors performance, and can remove them after a month of inactivity.
  • Profits follow an 80‑20 split in favor of affiliates, with ransom payments routed to separate wallets for the affiliate and the RaaS operator.
  • Targeting policy permits attacks outside the CIS and Serbia (excluding CIS consulates and linked firms), encourages strikes on critical infrastructure, and allows a dedicated SCADA locker, while forbidding attacks on child‑related healthcare and leaks of minors’ data.
  • The Windows locker uses ChaCha20‑Poly1305 encryption, fully encrypting files ≤3 MiB and chunk‑wise encrypting larger files, and includes capabilities for privilege checking, lateral movement, recovery inhibition, and optional self‑deletion.
  • Platform version 3 (released Jan 2026) adds structured victim records, life‑cycle states, team controls, per‑victim build options, deadline tracking, and shared operational access, formalizing affiliate workflows.
  • Insider‑threat allegations surfaced when a former Huntress employee claimed a current analyst leaked FBI communications to DevMan; Huntress labeled the act poor judgment, while the whistleblower insisted it constitutes an insider threat.
  • As of February 4 2026, DevMan claims 184 victims (≈50 U.S.) across technology, healthcare, finance, professional services, and government, with no new victims reported since that date.

Overview of DevMan RaaS Platform
DevMan maintains a dedicated web portal that serves as the nerve center for its ransomware‑as‑a‑service operation. Through this interface affiliates can generate ransomware payloads, monitor financial earnings, communicate with victims via chat, access support resources, view victim records, manage teams, and process payouts. The platform integrates access brokerage with ransomware deployment, allowing administrators to offer country‑specific “networks” and dictate whether affiliates use personal or program‑supplied ingress points, all within a two‑to‑three‑day completion window for each attack.

Historical Development and Lineage
The DevMan scheme first appeared in April 2025, initially acting as an affiliate for established groups such as Qilin, DragonForce, Apos, and RansomHub. By late 2025 the operators shifted to running their own RaaS. Malware analysts have noted that the locker’s code bears an “unmistakably DragonForce” DNA, indicating a direct lineage from that earlier ransomware family. In an October 2025 interview, a DevMan representative claimed prior collaboration with Conti and boasted of developing a specialized SCADA locker designed to push industrial control systems beyond safe operating parameters, causing hardware failure through thermal overload.

Affiliate Management and Governance
PRODAFT’s research identified five distinct internal roles within DevMan: LARVA‑367 (administrator/owner), LARVA‑546 (access coordinator), LARVA‑547 and LARVA‑548 (senior operators/coordinators), and LARVA‑550 (affiliate/operator credited for an installation). New affiliates are added to a corporate chat after producing their first victim and are paired with an experienced curator. The curator oversees performance, and affiliates can be removed after one month without a new victim. Team formation and public disclosure of affiliation require curator approval, limiting autonomous coordination. Core management also retains the authority to intervene in chats if an affiliate misbehaves or fails to meet commitments, thereby enforcing operational tempo and protecting revenue streams.

Revenue Model and Payout Structure
DevMan follows an 80‑20 profit split, allocating the larger share to the affiliate that carried out the attack and the remaining 20 % to the RaaS operator. The v3 portal rules stipulate that ransom funds are transmitted to two separate cryptocurrency wallets—one belonging to the affiliate and one linked to the DevMan program—ensuring transparent revenue distribution while preserving the operator’s cut.

Targeting Policy and Operational Rules
The group’s targeting policy permits affiliates to strike entities outside the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Serbia, explicitly excluding CIS consulates and CIS‑linked companies. A prior restriction on Saudi Arabia has been lifted. DevMan actively encourages attacks on critical infrastructure and advises affiliates to request a dedicated encryptor for SCADA systems, consistent with their claimed development of a specialized SCADA locker. Conversely, the policy prohibits attacks on child‑related healthcare facilities and the intentional leakage of personal data belonging to individuals under 18 years of age.

Technical Capabilities of DevMan Ransomware
Analysis of the Windows locker reveals a robust feature set: privilege checking to confirm administrator status, impairment of security controls, termination of processes and services, inhibition of recovery mechanisms, clearing of event logs, discovery of local and network shares, lateral movement, multi‑threaded encryption, ransom‑note generation, and optional self‑deletion. Encryption employs the ChaCha20‑Poly1305 algorithm; files up to and including 3 MiB are fully encrypted, while larger files are processed in 1 MiB chunks every 51 MiB, resulting in partial encryption of the remainder.

Portal Enhancements and Workflow Formalization
The third iteration of the DevMan portal (v3), released in January 2026, introduced several workflow‑oriented upgrades. Affiliates now can create structured victim records, assign life‑cycle states, form teams with invitation controls, select per‑victim build options, track deadlines, view revenue fields, and share operational access. PRODAFT notes that these changes reflect an effort to shift from ad‑hoc chat‑based coordination to a formalized platform capable of managing multiple intrusions concurrently.

Insider Threat Allegations Involving Huntress
In December 2025, former Huntress employee Ben Folland alleged that a current Huntress analyst leaked sensitive FBI communications to DevMan. According to Folland, the analyst forwarded exact FBI messages—including screenshots with agent names—to the threat actor, informed DevMan that law enforcement was investigating them, and refused to cooperate with the investigators. Huntress CEO Kyle Hanslovan characterized the disclosure as “poor judgement,” stating that the company revised policies, provided coaching, and took administrative actions, though no illegal conduct was proven. Folland, however, argued that the act meets the definition of an insider threat, likening it to a bank employee warning a fraudster of an impending police investigation.

Impact and Current Status
As recorded on Ransomware.Live, DevMan claims responsibility for 184 victims to date, with roughly half located in the United States. The most frequently targeted sectors are technology, healthcare, financial services, professional services, and government. No new victims have been reported after February 4 2026, suggesting a possible slowdown or shift in operations. The group’s continued emphasis on critical infrastructure, combined with its evolving affiliate platform and insider‑threat controversies, underscores the persistent challenges posed by DevMan to defenders worldwide.

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