Key Takeaways
- Threat actor O‑UNC‑066 uses voice‑based “vishing” calls to trick Microsoft 365 users into enrolling a fraudulent Entra passkey.
- The campaign targets food‑and‑beverage, technology, healthcare, automotive, construction, and aviation sectors.
- A custom operator‑controlled PHP phishing kit guides victims through a realistic‑looking Microsoft sign‑in and passkey‑enrollment flow in near real‑time.
- The kit harvests credentials, MFA tokens (TOTP, SMS OTP, push), and then forces the victim to approve an attacker‑initiated passkey registration.
- The 12‑word “recovery key” displayed during the fake passkey setup is a distraction tactic, not a legitimate recovery phrase.
- O‑UNC‑066 is linked to a data‑leak site named “Pink” and to the decentralized cybercrime collective known as The Com, which also includes Scattered Spider, ShinyHunters, and LAPSUS$.
- Organizations should enforce strict verification of passkey enrollment requests, monitor for anomalous Entra activity, and train users to reject unsolicited phone requests for security changes.
Overview of the Attack Campaign
Okta has identified a threat actor, tracked as O‑UNC‑066, that is conducting a large‑scale voice‑phishing (vishing) operation against enterprises across multiple industries. The actor convinces targets that they must register a new Microsoft Entra passkey, thereby guiding them through a counterfeit enrollment process that ultimately grants the attacker unauthorized access to the victim’s Microsoft 365 account. The scheme leverages the growing push for password‑less authentication, turning a security‑enhancement initiative into a conduit for data extortion and follow‑on intrusions.
Targeted Sectors
The activity has been observed in a diverse set of verticals, including food and beverage, technology, healthcare, automotive, construction, and aviation. This breadth suggests the threat actor is employing a opportunistic, “spray‑and‑pray” approach, selecting organizations that have recently begun or are planning to roll out passkey‑based authentication. By focusing on sectors where passkey adoption is gaining traction, the actor maximizes the likelihood that users will perceive the request as legitimate and comply without suspicion.
Voice‑Based Social Engineering (Vishing)
The initial contact is made via telephone, where the attacker poses as a legitimate IT or security representative. During the call, the victim is told that a security policy update requires them to enroll a new passkey for their Microsoft account. The caller’s persuasive tone and apparent authority lower the victim’s guard, making them more likely to follow the subsequent link‑based instructions. This vishing step is critical because it establishes trust and directs the user to the malicious phishing kit under the pretense of a routine security task.
Phishing Kit Architecture
Unlike traditional credential‑stealing sites that rely on static adversary‑in‑the‑middle (AitM) pages, O‑UNC‑066 deploys an operator‑controlled PHP panel. The kit is hosted on domains that incorporate the word “passkey” to appear credible. A separate operator (often distinct from the caller) manipulates the kit in real time, adjusting the presented pages and prompts based on the multi‑factor authentication (MFA) challenges observed in the genuine Microsoft sign‑in flow. This dynamic capability allows the attack to adapt to various MFA methods such as TOTP, SMS OTP, or push notifications with number matching.
Credential Harvesting Process
The interaction begins at the /gate endpoint, which shows a loading icon while the kit runs anti‑analysis checks. The victim then proceeds to /identify to enter their username, followed by /password for their password. Harvested credentials are immediately posted to /backend.php. The operator then uses these credentials to log into the legitimate Microsoft sign‑in page for the victim’s tenant. While the attacker’s session advances, the victim sees a /processing loading screen, awaiting the operator’s next instruction based on the MFA challenge presented by the real Microsoft service.
MFA Bypass Mechanics
Depending on the MFA method required by the victim’s account, the kit presents one of three subsequent pages: /submit-otp for an SMS‑based one‑time password, /submit-authenticator for a TOTP challenge, or /approve-authenticator for a push‑notification request. The operator captures the supplied OTP or records the push approval and forwards it to /backend.php. At this point, the attacker has satisfied the victim’s MFA requirements and holds an active session within the Microsoft 365 environment, effectively bypassing the intended phishing‑resistant protections of passkeys.
Passkey Enrollment Deception
With a valid session established, the attacker redirects the victim to the /passkey/register page, which mimics the genuine Microsoft passkey enrollment wizard. The victim is instructed to create a passkey, then guided through /passkey (to save a recovery key), /passkey/check (to confirm a seed‑phrase word), and finally /done, which falsely signals a successful registration. Throughout this sequence, the victim believes they are adding a legitimate passkey to their own device, while in reality the attacker is registering a passkey under their control within the victim’s Microsoft account.
Recovery Key as Distraction
The “recovery key” displayed during the fake passkey setup consists of 12 words resembling a cryptocurrency mnemonic phrase. Okta assesses this step as a deliberate distraction: it occupies the victim’s attention with a seemingly important security task while the attacker silently completes the passkey registration in the background. The phrase is not used for any legitimate recovery purpose; its sole function is to prolong the interaction and reduce the likelihood that the user will notice the illicit activity occurring concurrently.
Operator‑Controlled Real‑Time Adaptation
A notable feature of the kit is the operator’s ability to modify the user experience on the fly. By monitoring the MFA challenges presented by the authentic Microsoft service, the operator can switch between OTP, push, or TOTP pages instantaneously, ensuring the victim never encounters a mismatch that might raise suspicion. This real‑time tailoring significantly increases the success rate of the attack, as it accommodates a wide range of organizational MFA policies without requiring the victim to deviate from the expected flow.
Link to Data Leak Site and Cybercrime Collective
Okta notes that O‑UNC‑066 has operated a data‑leak site named “Pink” since April 2026. Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 tracks this activity under the identifier CL‑CRI‑1147 and associates it with the decentralized cybercrime collective known as The Com. The Com also encompasses notorious groups such as Scattered Spider, ShinyHunters, and LAPSUS$, indicating that O‑UNC‑066 shares tactics, infrastructure, or motives with these established threat actors. This affiliation suggests the passkey‑abuse campaign may be part of a broader strategy to harvest credentials for extortion, ransomware, or data‑sale operations.
Implications for Organizations and Mitigation
The abuse of passkey enrollment underscores that even phishing‑resistant technologies can be subverted when social engineering compromises the human element. Organizations should enforce strict out‑of‑band verification for any request to register or modify authentication methods, preferably requiring approval through a sanctioned IT ticketing system rather than a phone call. Monitoring Entra ID for anomalous passkey registrations—especially those initiated from unfamiliar IP addresses or devices—can aid early detection. Additionally, regular user training that highlights vishing tactics and encourages skepticism toward unsolicited security requests will reduce the likelihood of successful deception.
Conclusion
The O‑UNC‑066 campaign illustrates a sophisticated blend of voice phishing, real‑time credential harvesting, and abuse of emerging password‑less authentication mechanisms. By masquerading as a legitimate passkey enrollment process, the actor gains persistent access to Microsoft 365 accounts while distracting victims with a counterfeit recovery‑key step. Defending against such threats requires a combination of technical controls—such as conditional access policies, real‑time alerting on passkey changes, and anomalous login detection—and continuous security awareness training to empower employees to reject fraudulent phone‑based requests. As passkey adoption accelerates, vigilance against these evolving abuse patterns will be essential to safeguarding corporate data.

