Key Takeaways
- Former Queensland Office of Industrial Relations (OIR) deputy director‑general Peter McKay testified that he was aware of serious governance problems before accepting the role in 2023.
- McKay cited known issues involving the CFMEU’s influence, alleged unlawful directions to inspectors, and a personal relationship between senior officer Helen Burgess and a CFMEU delegate.
- He arranged pre‑appointment meetings with health and safety representatives to gauge the workplace climate.
- Evidence showed inspectors felt pressured to issue stop‑work orders targeting CFMEU opponents, suggesting regulatory capture.
- Sarina Wise, the OIR executive director for compliance and field services, disclosed a July 2025 conversation with an ethical‑standards unit staffer who had received information from the Crime and Corruption Commission (CCC) about Burgess’s undeclared relationship.
- The CFMEU delegate Paul Williams, whose son Nathan had been hired as an inspector by Burgess, was not disclosed as a potential conflict of interest.
- Nathan Williams was later transferred to another role, with no integrity concerns identified.
- After Burgess’s removal from her former position, Wise reported a “dramatic improvement” in team workplace culture.
- The inquiry’s findings highlight systemic governance failures, conflict‑of‑interest lapses, and the need for stronger oversight of regulator‑union interactions.
- Ongoing scrutiny may lead to reforms aimed at restoring independence and credibility to Queensland’s workplace safety regulator.
Introduction to the Inquiry and McKay’s Testimony
The Commission of Inquiry into the CFMEU and Misconduct in the Construction Industry reconvened on Wednesday, hearing from former deputy director‑general Peter McKay of Queensland’s Office of Industrial Relations (OIR). McKay’s appearance followed earlier testimony from frontline inspectors who described feeling coerced into issuing stop‑work orders against CFMEU rivals. His evidence was expected to shed light on senior‑level awareness of the office’s entrenched problems and the extent to which union influence may have compromised regulatory functions.
Known Governance Issues Within OIR
McKay opened his testimony by stating that, prior to accepting the role in 2023, he was already aware of “issues within the Office of Industrial Relations.” He referenced a backdrop of governance concerns that had surfaced after the departure of his predecessor, including questions about decision‑making transparency and internal accountability mechanisms. These pre‑existing weaknesses, he noted, created an environment where external pressures could more easily infiltrate routine operations.
Reluctance to Accept the Position Amid CFMEU Concerns
A central theme of McKay’s evidence was his reluctance to take up the deputy director‑general post because of the CFMEU’s pervasive involvement. He told the inquiry that he had knowledge of the union’s close ties to senior officer Helen Burgess and suspected that the CFMEU was exerting undue influence over inspectorate activities. This apprehension prompted him to seek reassurance before committing to the role, reflecting a prudent approach to a potentially compromised environment.
Pre‑Appointment Meetings With Health and Safety Representatives
To better understand the on‑the‑ground climate, McKay said he arranged meetings with health and safety representatives before formally moving into the position from elsewhere in the public service. Those discussions were intended to uncover any systemic intimidation, procedural irregularities, or morale issues that might affect his ability to lead effectively. The representatives’ feedback reportedly reinforced his concerns about inspector pressure and union‑related interference.
Evidence of Regulatory Capture and Inspector Pressure
The inquiry has repeatedly heard allegations that OIR inspectors were subjected to unlawful directions to write stop‑work orders targeting individuals or companies opposed to the CFMEU. McKay corroborated these claims, describing instances where inspectors felt compelled to act against their professional judgment due to external pressure. Such patterns point to a scenario of regulatory capture, where the regulator’s independence is compromised by the very industry it is meant to oversee.
Sarina Wise’s Testimony on the Ethical‑Standards Unit and CCC Referral
Sarina Wise, the OIR executive director for compliance and field services, provided complementary testimony regarding a July 2025 exchange with an ethical‑standards unit staff member. That staffer had received information forwarded by the Crime and Corruption Commission (CCC) concerning Helen Burgess. Wise’s account revealed that the CCC had uncovered evidence of a personal relationship between Burgess and a CFMEU delegate, which had not been formally disclosed within the agency.
Undisclosed Relationship Between Helen Burgess and CFMEU Delegate Paul Williams
The core of the CCC‑sourced information involved Helen Burgess’s de facto relationship with Paul Williams, a delegate of the CFMEU operating on the Gold Coast. Williams’s son, Nathan, had been employed by Burgess as an inspector roughly five years earlier. Neither Burgess nor Williams disclosed this familial connection, nor did they acknowledge any potential conflict of interest that could arise from such a hiring decision. The lack of transparency raised serious questions about nepotism and bias within the inspectorate ranks.
Nathan Williams’ Employment, Transfer, and Integrity Assessment
Nathan Williams had served as an inspector under Burgess’s supervision before being transferred to another role within the OIR. Wise noted that, despite the transfer, there were no identified concerns regarding Nathan’s personal integrity or professional conduct. The relocation appeared to be a procedural response to the conflict‑of‑interest risk rather than a disciplinary measure, underscoring the agency’s attempt to mitigate perceived bias after the relationship came to light.
Impact of Burgess’s Removal on Workplace Culture
Following Helen Burgess’s suspension and subsequent home raid by the CCC, Wise observed a marked shift in the atmosphere within her former team. She testified that there had been a “dramatic improvement” in workplace culture after Burgess’s removal, suggesting that her presence had contributed to a climate of discomfort, perceived favoritism, or undue union influence. The cultural turnaround indicates that leadership changes can have tangible effects on institutional morale and effectiveness.
Conclusion: Implications for Regulatory Reform and Oversight
The collective testimony of McKay, Wise, and earlier inspectors paints a picture of a regulator struggling with governance deficits, conflict‑of‑interest lapses, and external union pressure. These findings reinforce the inquiry’s broader contention that the CFMEU has achieved a degree of regulatory capture within the Office of Industrial Relations, compromising its ability to enforce safety standards impartially. Moving forward, the inquiry’s recommendations are likely to focus on strengthening conflict‑of‑interest disclosures, insulating inspectorate operations from undue influence, and restoring public confidence in Queensland’s workplace safety oversight. The upcoming months will reveal whether these insights translate into concrete reforms aimed at safeguarding both workers’ rights and the integrity of the safety regulator.