Key Takeaways
- Axon’s Bluetooth‑enabled tasers and body‑worn cameras broadcast a fixed MAC address, making them detectable by any smartphone or laptop within several hundred metres.
- A Melbourne‑based hacker demonstrated that inexpensive apps can locate, identify, and track police officers in real time, a capability he warned could be weaponised for ambushes or evasion.
- Despite internal risk assessments confirming the threat, Victoria Police and other Australian law‑enforcement agencies have taken no concrete action, citing manufacturer assurances and internal testing that found no issues.
- Axon acknowledges the vulnerability in its documentation but argues the flaw is hardware‑based, requiring a full redesign rather than a software patch; the company has not issued a recall or mandated MAC‑address randomisation.
- The issue extends beyond Australia, with U.S. Border Patrol agents instructed to stop using Axon cameras after similar concerns were raised, and online tutorials showing how to exploit the flaw are publicly available.
- Police unions and most state forces declined to comment on whether officers have been informed of the risk, leaving frontline personnel potentially unaware that their equipment could reveal their location to criminals.
Discovery of the Bluetooth Tracking Flaw
The hacker first noticed the issue while logging nearby Bluetooth devices on his phone. Repeated notifications revealed the presence of Axon‑manufactured tasers and body‑worn cameras, each broadcasting a static MAC address that could be read without encryption. Unlike most modern smartphones, which randomise their Bluetooth identifiers to thwart tracking, Axon’s devices left this identifying information exposed. The hacker realised that the lack of MAC‑address randomisation meant anyone with a basic Bluetooth scanner could pinpoint the exact location of police gear, turning standard equipment into inadvertent beacons.
How the Exploit Works in Practice
Using a freely available Android app, the hacker received alerts such as “police detected” whenever an Axon device came within range. The app displayed latitude, longitude, device model, and serial number, allowing him to map officers’ movements in real time. He demonstrated that his custom proof‑of‑concept software could detect devices from up to 400 metres away, and that a network of low‑cost Bluetooth scatterers could extend coverage across entire suburbs, providing criminals with a live tactical overview of police deployments.
Potential Weaponisation by Criminal Elements
The hacker stressed that the vulnerability is not merely a privacy concern; it can be actively exploited to ambush, evade, or monitor law‑enforcement operations. Organised gangs could deploy dozens of inexpensive Bluetooth scanners around a town, creating a live map that reveals when officers are conducting surveillance, executing raids, or returning to stations. Such information could be used to time attacks, avoid checkpoints, or even thwart undercover work by exposing officers who believe they are operating covertly.
Attempts to Alert Authorities
After confirming the flaw, the hacker contacted every Australian police agency, police ministers, federal police, and national‑security bodies. In Victoria, he sent an initial email in 2024 detailing how his software could detect officers from 400 metres away and urging a recall of Axon tasers and the implementation of MAC‑address randomisation. He received no reply from any agency. Subsequent follow‑ups emphasized that the gap in operational security was “gaping” and easily exploitable, yet his warnings were met with silence.
Internal Police Assessment and Inaction
Four Corners verified that Victoria Police did receive the hacker’s 2024 email and conducted an internal threat assessment. The review concluded that the risk was genuine and recommended immediate action, especially for surveillance and undercover units. However, after consulting Axon, senior executives dismissed the finding as a non‑issue, asserting that no incidents had occurred. Victoria Police later told the broadcaster they had found no evidence of unauthorised access or tracking, despite the earlier internal recommendation to act.
Responses from Other Jurisdictions
When approached, police forces in New South Wales, Queensland, Western Australia, Tasmania, South Australia, the ACT, and the Northern Territory either declined to comment or offered vague statements. NSW Police acknowledged awareness of Bluetooth‑tracking concerns but framed them as a general challenge for law enforcement, without specifying any mitigations. Queensland Police provided no response, while other states similarly refused to confirm whether officers had been informed of the risk or what steps, if any, had been taken to protect them.
Axon’s Position and Technical Limitations
Axon does not deny that its devices emit detectable Bluetooth and Wi‑Fi signals; the company’s trust and security page includes a disclaimer warning customers that “Axon Cameras’ Bluetooth and Wi‑Fi radio signals can be generally detected” and advising operational‑security considerations before deployment. However, Axon maintains that the MAC‑address issue is a hardware limitation: the firmware cannot be patched to randomise addresses, and a fix would require a complete redesign of the Bluetooth module. The company told the hacker that addressing the flaw would necessitate recalling existing stock—a costly and logistically difficult undertaking.
Impact on Current Axon Deployments Across Australia
Most Australian states continue to use Axon’s T7 model tasers (NSW, VIC, WA, ACT) and, in Queensland and Tasmania, the T10 model. All of these units share the same un‑randomised Bluetooth MAC address, meaning the vulnerability is nationwide. South Australia’s SAPOL claims its newly acquired T10 models are not affected because they lack Bluetooth integration with other equipment, but the vast majority of frontline officers still rely on the vulnerable models. Axon’s market dominance—supplying tasers to over 18,000 policing agencies worldwide and holding a near‑monopoly on conducted‑energy devices—amplifies the potential scale of the risk.
Expert Concerns About Dependence on Axon
Criminologist Emma Ryan, who has researched tasers extensively, warned that Australian policing has become “captured” by Axon, making it difficult for agencies to diversify their equipment or demand stronger security safeguards. She expressed shock that tools intended to protect officers could instead endanger them, noting that many police may be unaware that their body‑worn cameras and tasers are broadcasting their location. Ryan called for greater transparency, independent testing, and, if necessary, the exploration of alternative vendors that implement proper Bluetooth privacy measures.
Conclusion and Call for Action
The investigation reveals a clear and present danger: law‑enforcement officers across Australia are unknowingly carrying devices that can be tracked by anyone with a smartphone or cheap Bluetooth scanner. Despite internal acknowledgements of the risk and public warnings from security researchers, neither police agencies nor Axon have taken decisive steps to mitigate the threat. Implementing MAC‑address randomisation—or recalling and replacing the vulnerable hardware—would eliminate the ability of criminals to exploit this flaw. Until such measures are adopted, frontline personnel remain exposed to a surveillance gap that could be exploited for ambushes, evasion, or the undermining of covert operations, underscoring the urgent need for coordinated action between manufacturers, police leadership, and governmental oversight bodies.