Key Takeaways
- Both Sir Simon Barton (former Permanent Secretary at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office) and Morgan McSweeney (former Downing Street chief of staff) acknowledged that there was intense pressure from Number 10 to secure Peter Mandelson’s appointment as UK ambassador to the United States before Joe Biden’s inauguration, though they stressed that the pressure concerned the speed of the process, not a request to bypass vetting.
- McSweeney admitted that advising the Prime Minister to appoint Mandelson was a “serious error of judgment,” insisting his relationship with Mandelson was limited and that his motivation was primarily Mandelson’s trade expertise, not personal favoritism.
- Both officials raised concerns about Mandelson’s historic ties to Jeffrey Epstein; McSweeney documented his worries in writing (now withheld by the Metropolitan Police), while Barton said he was aware of the “toxic” nature of the connection from his US experience.
- The alleged “just fucking approve” phone call from McSweeney to Barton is a myth; both men denied ever speaking that way, calling the rumor damaging and unfounded.
- Neither Barton nor McSweeney was aware that Mandelson had ultimately failed the UK security‑vetting process; they said no contingency plan existed for such a failure, though they acknowledged the possibility was always on the table.
- Official documentation of conversations was sparse; both officials regretted not involving the Cabinet Office’s propriety and ethics team (PET) in follow‑up inquiries about the Epstein links and conceded that the vetting process was unusually rushed, with the announcement preceding completion of the checks.
Pressure from Number 10 to Accelerate Mandelson’s Appointment
Sir Simon Barton testified that the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) faced “absolutely” pressure to get Peter Mandelson to Washington as quickly as possible. He clarified, however, that the pressure was about the pace of the process rather than a demand to ignore or shortcut the mandatory security‑vetting procedures. Barton said that Number 10 was “uninterested” in the details of the vetting itself; the focus was solely on ensuring Mandelson could arrive before the inauguration of the new US administration.
McSweeney’s Advice and Admission of Error
Morgan McSweeney confirmed that he had advised the Prime Minister to support Mandelson’s appointment, later describing that advice as a “serious error of judgment.” He maintained that his personal relationship with Mandelson had been exaggerated: the two had barely met before 2017, and Mandelson showed little interest in McSweeney’s Labour Together project. McSweeney said he later viewed Mandelson as a strategic confidante on political matters, but he was not involved in candidate vetting or reshuffles. His primary rationale for backing the appointment was Mandelson’s extensive trade experience, which he believed crucial for securing a US‑UK trade deal.
Concerns Over Mandelson’s Epstein Links
Both witnesses acknowledged lingering unease about Mandelson’s association with Jeffrey Epstein. McSweeney said he had put his concerns in writing and received a reply; that email is now being held by the Metropolitan Police as part of its investigations. He added that, after seeing later revelations—particularly the Bloomberg report in September 2025—he felt the situation was “way, way, way worse” than he had anticipated, describing it as “a knife through my soul.” Barton echoed this sentiment, stating he was well aware of the “toxic” nature of the Epstein connection from his time in the United States and his understanding of American politics, though he noted that only information already in the public domain was known to him at the time. He also suggested that the National Security Adviser, Jonathan Powell, shared similar reservations.
The “Just Fucking Approve” Rumor Debunked
The committee examined a persistent rumor that McSweeney had telephoned Barton and demanded, “just fucking approve it.” Both Barton and McSweeney categorically denied the claim. Barton said he had never spoken to McSweeney outside of group meetings and that he had never used profanity in such contexts. McSweeney called the rumor “something that has caused me a great deal of stress for a number of months,” criticizing the practice of spreading unverified stories in politics that damage reputations and unfairly target staff who cannot defend themselves. He urged journalists and politicians to verify claims before amplifying them.
Unawareness of Mandelson’s Vetting Failure
Neither Barton nor McSweeney was aware that Mandelson had ultimately failed the UK security‑vetting process. Barton avoided directly answering whether sacking Olly Robbins was the right decision but said he had never before been involved in a appointment that displayed so many “red flags.” McSweeney stated that Number 10 had no formal contingency plan for a vetting failure, though they always recognized that such an outcome was possible for any senior appointment. When asked if he thought Mandelson might fail, McSweeney replied, “No. And if it had happened, we’d have withdrawn the ambassadorship. It would have been a political embarrassment.”
Sparse Official Records and Regrets Over Process
Both officials conceded that proper records of conversations were rarely kept. McSweeney admitted that it had not been ideal for him and Labour’s communications chief, Matthew Doyle, to be the ones contacting Mandelson about the Epstein issue after it surfaced in initial due‑diligence. He reflected that involving the Cabinet Office’s propriety and ethics team (PET) would have been more appropriate: “When I look back on it, I certainly think it would have been much, much better if I’d asked PET to ask those follow‑up questions.” He explained his original thinking—that written follow‑ups from a senior official would elicit truthful responses—but accepted that the prime minister’s decision ultimately rested on the assumption that the full vetting would uncover any problems. Barton similarly sidestepped a direct question on whether due process had been followed, noting that his remit—up to his resignation on 19 January—had been carried out “at pace as we were asked,” and that it was “unusual for the announcement to be made before he [Mandelson] was vetted.”
Overall Assessment of the Appointment Process
The testimony paints a picture of a high‑stakes, time‑critical appointment driven by strategic trade considerations, conducted under considerable pressure to move quickly, yet hampered by insufficient documentation and a lack of robust safeguards against known risks. While both Barton and McSweeney maintained they never sought to bypass vetting, the speed at which the process unfolded left little room for thorough scrutiny, particularly regarding Mandelson’s controversial Epstein connections. The absence of a contingency plan for a potential vetting failure, combined with the reliance on informal channels for sensitive inquiries, raised questions about the robustness of the government’s appointment procedures. The episode ultimately underscores the tension between political expediency and the imperative of rigorous security checks, especially for senior diplomatic roles that carry significant national‑security implications.