Key Takeaways
- Shadow Defence Minister James Paterson floated the idea of acquiring U.S. B‑21 stealth bombers to fill a prospective strike capability gap while Australia waits for AUKUS nuclear submarines.
- Paterson stressed that the government alone can decide whether the RAAF is suited to operate the B‑21, but urged close examination of alternatives if the bomber proves unsuitable.
- He highlighted the strategic importance of deterring coercion that targets Australia’s supply‑chain chokepoints, such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Malacca Strait.
- Paterson reiterated the Coalition’s push to lift defence spending to at least 3 % of GDP, arguing that AUKUS cannot be delivered without a substantial budget increase without cannibalising other services.
- Defence Minister Richard Marles defended the U.S. alliance and the rules‑based order, noting that no alternative coalition could replace American support for Australia’s core interests.
Background: AUKUS Submarines and the Capability Gap
Australia’s current defence plan hinges on the AUKUS agreement, which will eventually deliver a fleet of Virginia‑class nuclear‑powered submarines. However, the first boats are not expected to enter service until the late 2020s, leaving a potential void in long‑range strike capability. The retirement of the F‑111 in 2010 left the Royal Australian Air Force without a dedicated bomber platform, creating a gap that policymakers are now scrutinising as regional tensions rise.
Paterson’s Proposal: Considering the B-21 Raider
In his National Press Club address, Shadow Defence Minister James Paterson raised the possibility of acquiring the United States’ next‑generation B‑21 Raider stealth bomber. He clarified that he was not committing the Coalition to purchase the aircraft nor demanding that the government do so, but argued that the option merits serious consideration given the looming capability interval.
Cost Estimates and US Acquisition Plans
Paterson noted that each B‑21 is estimated to cost roughly US $1 billion. The United States intends to procure about 100 of these bombers to replace its ageing B‑2 fleet, indicating a mature production line and established sustainment framework that could benefit a partner nation seeking rapid fielding.
Assessing Feasibility for the RAAF
He emphasized that only the Australian government can determine whether the RAAF possesses the infrastructure, trained personnel, and operational doctrine necessary to integrate and sustain the B‑21. Paterson acknowledged that there might be valid reasons why the bomber would not suit Australia’s needs, urging a thorough evaluation before any decision.
Potential Alternatives if B-21 Not Suitable
Should the B‑21 prove impractical, Paterson called for the government to “very closely examine other similar options” that could deliver comparable long‑range, penetrating strike capability. This reflects a broader principle: maintaining a credible deterrent while awaiting the submarine fleet should not be left to chance.
US Congressional Interest and Possible Transfer
Separate to Paterson’s remarks, some U.S. policy circles have floated the idea of transferring B‑21s to Australia as a means to “accelerate” national security while the AUKUS submarines mature. A congressional proposal to the U.S. Defence Secretary suggests that such a transfer could be framed as a security‑cooperation measure, strengthening interoperability between the two air forces.
Strategic Rationale: Deterrence Against Coercion
Paterson framed the bomber discussion within a wider strategic narrative: Australia’s primary security threat is not a direct invasion but coercion that exploits its supply‑chain vulnerabilities. He warned that a disruption to key maritime corridors—such as the Strait of Hormuz—could severely impact the nation’s economy and security posture.
Spotlight on Indo‑Pacific Shipping Chokepoints
Expanding on this point, he invited listeners to imagine a scenario where the Straits of Malacca—a vital conduit for global trade—were similarly closed or threatened. The ability to project power and hold potential adversaries at risk, he argued, is essential to deter such coercive acts and preserve freedom of navigation.
Paterson’s Call for Higher Defence Spending
The shadow minister also used the platform to reiterate the Coalition’s demand for a significant increase in defence expenditure. He reminded the audience that the party had committed to lifting defence spending to at least 3 % of GDP (in budget terms) at the last election, a target he said is indispensable for funding AUKUS without compromising other capabilities.
Coalition’s 3% of GDP Target vs Government’s Stance
Paterson criticised the Albanese government for failing to move the needle on defence spending over the past four years, asserting that without a higher fiscal commitment, delivering AUKUS would force cuts elsewhere—a scenario he warned would repeat past mistakes highlighted by former Chief of Defence Sir Angus Houston.
Response from Defence Minister Richard Marles
In reply, Defence Minister Richard Marles defended the current trajectory, emphasizing that the U.S. alliance remains “indispensable” for Australian security. He gently pushed back on notions that the rules‑based order is extinct, arguing that no alternative coalition could replicate the strategic weight the United States brings to the Indo‑Pacific.
Conclusion: Balancing Capability, Alliances and Budget
Overall, Paterson’s speech intertwined three threads: the urgency of filling a near‑term strike gap, the necessity of bolstering defence financing to sustain AUKUS, and the enduring value of the U.S. partnership. While the B‑21 remains a conceptual option rather than a firm proposal, the debate underscores Australia’s broader challenge of aligning capability aspirations, alliance commitments, and budgetary realities in an increasingly contested region.