Key Takeaways
- Sen. Mark Warner (D‑Va.) will introduce the “Guaranteeing Universal Access to Cybersecurity Act” to restore and double federal funding for the Multi‑State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS‑ISAC).
- The bill authorizes $50 million per year for the Center for Internet Security (CIS) to run MS‑ISAC, far exceeding the $27 million appropriated in 2025 and reversing a recent $8.3 million cut.
- MS‑ISAC currently provides free cyber threat intelligence, monitoring, and technical assistance to roughly 18,000 state, local, territorial, tribal entities and critical‑infrastructure operators.
- Warner’s letters to DHS Secretary Markwayne Mullin and to the nation’s governors stress the national‑security risks posed by the funding lapse and urge immediate reinstatement of the CISA‑CIS cooperative agreement.
- The legislation also mandates outreach to rebuild MS‑ISAC membership, interoperability with the FBI and other federal agencies, and regular reporting to Congress on participation and barriers.
Overview of Warner’s Legislative Proposal
Sen. Mark Warner, D‑Va., is poised to introduce the “Guaranteeing Universal Access to Cybersecurity Act,” a bill designed to reinstate and expand federal support for the Multi‑State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS‑ISAC). According to Warner’s office, the legislation would authorize $50 million annually for the Center for Internet Security (CIS), which operates MS‑ISAC, beginning in fiscal year 2027 and continuing each year thereafter. The goal is to enable state, local, territorial, and tribal governments to defend their networks and critical infrastructure against cyber threats. By securing a steady, multi‑year funding stream, the bill seeks to eliminate the uncertainty that has plagued MS‑ISAC since recent budget cuts.
Funding Scale and Historical Context
The proposed $50 million per year represents more than double the most recent federal investment in MS‑ISAC. In FY 2025 Congress appropriated $27 million for the center, but in March 2025 then‑DHS Secretary Kristi Noem partially defunded several MS‑ISAC activities, removing about $8.3 million—over half of the $15.7 million that remained at the time. Despite the cut, CIS has kept the program afloat through a fee‑based membership model, charging $1 million per month to participants. Warner’s bill would not only restore the lost funds but also provide a substantial increase, ensuring MS‑ISAC can operate at full capacity without relying on ad‑hoc member contributions.
Reach and Impact of MS‑ISAC Services
Before the funding interruption, MS‑ISAC delivered free cybersecurity resources, threat‑intelligence sharing, monitoring, and technical assistance to approximately 18,000 state, local, territorial, tribal organizations and critical‑infrastructure operators, including public hospitals, utilities, K‑12 schools, and law‑enforcement agencies. The services acted as a national hub for community defense coordination, allowing disparate entities to collaborate on threat detection and response. The September 2025 decision by CISA not to renew its agreement with CIS formally ended this interoperability, leaving many jurisdictions without timely intelligence and increasing their vulnerability to ransomware, espionage, and other cyber threats.
Warner’s Letter to DHS Secretary Mullin
In a letter addressed to Department of Homeland Security Secretary Markwayne Mullin, Warner criticized the previous administration’s abrupt cancellation of MS‑ISAC funding, arguing that it jeopardized national security and imposed unexpected costs on state, local, territorial, and tribal (SLTT) budgets. He urged Mullin to prioritize the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and to restore the cooperative agreement with CIS, describing the defunding as an “abdication of responsibility.” Warner emphasized that without federal support, small and rural communities lack access to the threat picture MS‑ISAC provides, leading to dangerous information silos and weakened critical‑infrastructure defenses.
Legislative Mechanisms for Re‑engagement
The bill includes specific directives for CISA’s director—currently Nick Andersen in an acting capacity—to renew the formal agreement with CIS for MS‑ISAC operations. It also requires the director to conduct targeted outreach aimed at recovering membership lost during the defunding period and to expand access to eligible entities that have not previously participated, such as additional critical‑infrastructure sectors. Furthermore, CISA must report to Congress on the number of re‑enrolled and new members, identify any barriers to participation, and maintain interoperability support with the FBI and other relevant federal agencies to strengthen the national cyber threat‑intelligence ecosystem.
Broader Funding Gaps and Administration Actions
Warner’s initiative arrives amid a wider trend of diminished federal cybersecurity assistance. At the end of the previous month, several state technology officials testified before a House Homeland Security subcommittee, urging Congress to reauthorize the expired State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program, which had allocated $1 billion through the 2021 infrastructure bill. The senator’s letter also referenced the Trump administration’s “politically‑motivated sabotage of CISA,” noting that such actions have eroded the nation’s cyber defenses and heightened risks from ransomware, AI‑enhanced attacks, and state‑sponsored threats.
Governor‑Focused Appeal and Cybersecurity Risks
Parallel to his congressional effort, Warner sent a letter to every governor urging them to bolster protections for state and local government assets and critical infrastructure. He warned that attacks on interconnected systems—such as the power grid—could cascade into failures of water treatment, hospitals, and schools, potentially causing loss of life. The letter highlighted how artificial intelligence lowers the barrier for sophisticated, asymmetric attacks while amplifying adversaries’ capabilities, citing a recent ransomware incident that disabled Nevada’s state web assets for weeks. Warner advocated for regional coordination, statewide infrastructure audits, enhanced threat‑intelligence sharing, and targeted support for under‑resourced operators as essential steps governors can take to mitigate these dangers.
Conclusion and Implications
If enacted, the Guaranteeing Universal Access to Cybersecurity Act would provide a stable, significant federal investment in MS‑ISAC, reversing recent setbacks and strengthening the nation’s cyber‑defense foundation. By mandating CISA‑CIS cooperation, outreach, and accountability, the legislation aims to close intelligence gaps, rebuild eroded partnerships, and ensure that even the smallest communities can benefit from shared threat information. Warner’s dual push—through Capitol Hill and direct outreach to governors—underscores a recognition that cybersecurity is a shared responsibility requiring sustained federal backing and proactive state leadership. The outcome of this effort could shape the resilience of America’s critical infrastructure for years to come.