Key Takeaways
- The Labour Court dismissed Major‑General Feroz Khan’s urgent application, ruling it had no jurisdiction to stop the ongoing SAPS disciplinary process.
- Judge Connie Prinsloo found Khan failed to show the required urgency, noting an adequate alternative remedy existed under SAPS Regulation 9(7).
- Any challenge to the fairness of his dismissal or the conversion of sick leave to unpaid suspension must be pursued through the Safety and Security Sectoral Bargaining Council (SSSBC), not the Labour Court.
- Khan bypassed the internal procedure prescribed by Regulation 9(7) by approaching the court instead of liaising with the presiding officer to reconvene the inquiry.
- He missed the scheduled expedited disciplinary hearing on 12 August 2026 and a subsequent virtual appearance on 13 August 2026, triggering the regulation’s ten‑day reconvene period, which he ignored in favour of litigation.
- The court’s decision cleared the way for SAPS to complete the disciplinary process, resulting in Khan’s dismissal.
Background and Dismissal of Major‑General Feroz Khan
Major‑General Feroz Khan was removed from the South African Police Service (SAPS) after the Labour Court refused to grant his urgent application to halt an expedited disciplinary inquiry. The court struck his application from the roll, allowing SAPS to continue with the disciplinary proceedings that ultimately led to his dismissal. The judgment, delivered by Judge Connie Prinsloo, clarified the limits of the Labour Court’s authority in matters of internal police discipline and underscored the proper channels for contesting such actions.
Labour Court’s Jurisdictional Limitation
Judge Prinsloo’s primary rationale for rejecting Khan’s urgent application was the Labour Court’s lack of jurisdiction over incomplete internal disciplinary proceedings. She held that the Labour Court does not possess a general power to intervene in ongoing disciplinary hearings unless a specific statutory provision expressly grants that authority. Khan’s attempt to recast the dispute as a contractual claim did not overcome this jurisdictional barrier, leaving the court unable to grant the interim relief he sought.
Failure to Demonstrate Urgency
In addition to the jurisdictional issue, the judge determined that Khan had not satisfied the urgency requirement necessary for an urgent hearing. She pointed out that Regulation 9(7) of the SAPS disciplinary regulations provided Khan with an adequate alternative remedy: he could contact the presiding officer within ten working days to request a reconvening of the inquiry and explain his absence. Because this route was available and could still yield substantial relief, the court concluded that there was no pressing need to intervene urgently via the Labour Court.
Appropriate Forum for Disputes: SSSBC
The judgment further clarified that any challenge to the fairness of Khan’s dismissal—or to the conversion of his sick leave into unpaid suspension—should be pursued through the statutory labour dispute resolution system, specifically the Safety and Security Sectoral Bargaining Council (SSSBC). Judge Prinsloo emphasized that such matters fall within the SSSBC’s jurisdiction, not the urgent Labour Court. This delineation reinforces the principle that internal disciplinary fairness issues must be addressed via the designated sectoral bargaining mechanisms rather than through ad‑hoc court applications.
Khan’s Bypass of Regulation 9(7) Remedy
Rather than employing the internal mechanism laid out in Regulation 9(7), Khan opted to approach the Labour Court directly, seeking to halt the disciplinary process. The judgment notes that, instead of liaising with the presiding officer to reconvene the inquiry—as the regulation required—Khan’s representatives (through the police union POPCRU) filed an urgent court application. By circumventing the prescribed internal procedure, Khan forfeited the opportunity to address his non‑attendance through the regulator‑provided channel, which the court viewed as a procedural misstep.
Details of the Expedited Disciplinary Hearing and Khan’s Absences
According to the court record, Khan was ordered to appear before an expedited disciplinary inquiry scheduled for 12 to 14 August 2026, after receiving notice on 29 July 2026. He failed to attend the hearing on 12 August 2026, although his legal representatives appeared to request representation and a postponement. After both requests were denied, he was directed to appear again—either in person or virtually—on 13 August 2026, but he again did not attend. These consecutive absences triggered the presiding officer’s invocation of Regulation 9(7), which afforded Khan a ten‑working‑day window to contact the officer and seek a reconvening of the proceedings.
Presiding Officer’s Invocation of Regulation 9(7) and Khan’s Response
On 17 August 2026, the presiding officer formally invoked Regulation 9(7), giving Khan until 26 August 2026 to reach out and request that the disciplinary inquiry be reconvened. Instead of utilizing this remedy, Khan, acting through POPCRU, filed the urgent Labour Court application on the same day, attempting to stop the process altogether. The judgment emphasized that this course of action was contrary to the regulatory framework, which already provided a clear, time‑bound pathway for addressing his absence without resorting to litigation.
Implications and Conclusion
The Labour Court’s ruling effectively removed any judicial impediment to SAPS’s disciplinary proceedings, allowing the service to finalize its investigation and dismiss Major‑General Feroz Khan. The decision underscores the importance of adhering to internal procedural remedies before seeking external judicial intervention, especially in matters of employment discipline within the security sector. It also clarifies the division of jurisdiction: urgent Labour Court relief is unavailable for ongoing disciplinary hearings absent explicit statutory authority, while fairness disputes belong to the SSSBC. Consequently, Khan’s case serves as a precedent reinforcing that employees must first exhaust prescribed internal mechanisms—such as Regulation 9(7)’s reconvene option—before turning to the courts for relief.