Key Takeaways
- Operation Prosper deployed 2,200 SANDF troops across five provinces at a projected cost of > R800 million, with the Eastern Cape added after public outcry.
- Initial community enthusiasm in Gauteng and parts of the Eastern Cape faded as gang‑related killings continued, including the deaths of two Anti‑Gang Unit officers and civilians.
- In the Western Cape, 70 people were killed in gang violence over a single week, and residents report that soldiers are visible but gangs remain in control of neighbourhoods.
- The Eastern Cape shows a mixed picture: limited impact in Gqeberha’s Northern Areas versus tangible reductions in shootings in Humansdorp, highlighting the importance of deployment effectiveness and community cooperation.
- Experts argue the crisis stems from deep‑rooted governance failures—poverty, unemployment, and lack of legitimate opportunity—rather than merely a shortage of security personnel.
- Parliamentary committees have launched a public inquiry and plan a solutions‑based summit, stressing that military action must be paired with long‑term, collaborative measures.
- Funding delays have left the Department of Defence without the R823 million earmarked for the 12‑month deployment, raising concerns about the operation’s sustainability.
- Overall, the evidence suggests that while SANDF support can provide short‑term stability, breaking the grip of gangs requires addressing socioeconomic drivers and strengthening police investigative capacity.
Overview of Operation Prosper Deployment
Following President Cyril Ramaphosa’s 2026 State of the Nation Address, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) dispatched 2,200 soldiers from 1 March to assist police in combating crime, gang violence, and illegal mining across five provinces. Acting Police Minister Firoz Cachalia later announced that the operation, named Operation Prosper, would be extended to the Eastern Cape after protests from residents of Gqeberha’s Northern Areas. The intervention is budgeted to exceed R800 million and is slated to run until March 2027. The deployment reflects a high‑profile, short‑term security surge intended to bolster overstretched police units, yet its effectiveness has become a subject of intense scrutiny as violence persists in many targeted areas.
Gauteng: Initial optimism and rising violence
In Gauteng, 500 troops were assigned to Operation Prosper at a cost of R80 million, with the mandate set to run until the end of April 2027. The arrival of the army was met with enthusiasm; on 11 March a convoy of at least 25 SANDF vehicles paraded through Riverlea, Johannesburg, prompting cheers from residents and schoolchildren lining the streets. However, the optimism was short‑lived. On 7 August, two Gauteng SAPS Anti‑Gang Unit officers—Constable Thapelo Tlomatsane (29) and Constable Sphiwe Sibeko (28)—were killed alongside two civilians in an apparent ambush in Reiger Park. Earlier, on 9 June, a heavily armed gang stormed the gated Jumpers informal settlement in Cleveland, Johannesburg, opening fire indiscriminately and killing 13 people. Although police initially hesitated to link the massacre to illegal mining, community leaders and political parties argue that syndicates refining illicit gold in the area are a primary driver of the bloodshed. Acting Police Minister Cachalia responded by calling for the state to “reclaim our streets” and admitted that, despite reinforced resources, “we are not winning,” underscoring the limits of a purely militarised response.
Western Cape: Persistent gang control despite troops
The Western Cape experienced a stark reminder of the gang crisis when 70 people were killed in gang violence and mass shootings between 2 August and 9 August. Police reported no arrests in connection with these killings. newly appointed Western Cape Police Commissioner Lieutenant‑General Sizakhele William Dyantyi pledged to intensify the fight against gangs, illegal firearms, and extortion, yet community assessments remain bleak. Benedicta van Vuuren, DA Western Cape spokesperson on police oversight, noted that the provincial death toll for the year to date stood at 2,641 killings—about 12 murders per day—of which 1,658 were gang‑related. A Daily Maverick visit to Leonsdale in Elsies River revealed that residents view army patrols as little more than vehicles passing through; Chief Hamish Arries of the Elsies River Community Police Forum described the presence as “a nice gesture, but… it’s not addressing the problem.” Former gang member Gert Davids attributed the enduring violence to poverty, unemployment, and a lack of legitimate opportunities, noting that gangs control movement through narrow alleys, creating invisible territorial boundaries that restrict residents’ freedom of movement and instill constant fear.
Eastern Cape: Mixed outcomes
The Eastern Cape presents a more nuanced picture of Operation Prosper’s impact. In Gqeberha’s Northern Areas, community activists and policing forums complain that soldiers are barely visible, with little discernible change in gang‑related crime or drug arrests. Nelson Mandela Bay Community Police Board chairperson Eddie Alexander criticised authorities for failing to involve communities in the operations, stating that he cannot see any significant progress in arrests or detailed feedback on gang‑related crime. Helenvale activist Audrey Hitzeroth recalled an initial drop in gunshots and a sense of safety when troops first arrived, but observed that gangsters quickly reverted to their old ways, with soldiers responding mainly after shootings or upon receiving tips about drug dens. By contrast, in Humansdorp, community activist Chandrion Windvogel reported that residents welcomed the troops with jubilation. Joint army‑police operations there disrupted gang activity and contributed to a noticeable reduction in shootings. The divergent experiences raise a critical question: whether the problem lies in how effectively soldiers are deployed in collaboration with police and local communities, rather than the mere presence of military personnel.
Constitutional rights and governance crisis
Analysts contend that the gang epidemic is less a policing shortfall and more a symptom of failed governance. Author and former Western Cape head of detectives Major‑General Jeremy Vearey argued that in gang‑dominated neighbourhoods, constitutional freedoms—freedom of movement, association, and economic activity—are effectively nullified. “The Constitution and the Bill of Rights do not exist in terms of freedom of movement, association or economic activity in a gang‑ridden area. There are no such rights there,” Vearey told Daily Maverick. He linked the problem to pervasive poverty and unemployment, which enable gangs to recruit and sustain influence, and advocated for declaring a state of disaster to mobilise all state resources across sectors. Institute for Security Studies analyst Willem Els echoed this view, describing the crisis as fundamentally a governance failure. He noted that elections are meant to forge a social contract whereby the state provides safety, services, and economic opportunity; when these obligations are repeatedly unmet, alternative power structures—gangs—fill the vacuum. Els emphasized that crime prevention largely falls to the police, but many drivers of gang violence—poverty, unemployment, inadequate housing, drug markets, and addiction—lie beyond their mandate, leaving officers to contain violence without the tools to address its root causes. Consequently, the SANDF, lacking investigative mandate and capacity to dismantle criminal networks, can at best stabilise an area temporarily; without continuous presence and broader socioeconomic intervention, violence tends to recur like a returning wave.
Parliamentary inquiry and calls for broader solutions
Recognising the limitations of military‑only interventions, Parliament’s Portfolio Committee on Police launched a public inquiry on 11 August into gang‑related violent crime, inviting victims, civil society, and community organisations to testify. Committee chairperson Ian Cameron stressed that public participation must transcend a “tick‑box exercise” and that the inquiry aims to generate practical solutions and improve cooperation among government, communities, and civil society. A solutions‑based summit is scheduled for 19 August to examine the causes of gang violence, assess required resources, and devise ways to sustain collaboration. Prior to the summit, the police and defence portfolio committees, together with the Joint Standing Committee on Defence, will conduct an oversight visit to evaluate the SANDF deployment’s impact in Cape Town. Cameron cautioned against viewing military intervention as a long‑term fix, asserting that while it may be necessary in the short term, the scourge demands sustained, collaborative measures that address underlying social and economic deficits.
Funding delays and sustainability concerns
A significant operational obstacle has emerged: the promised funding for Operation Prosper has not yet reached the Department of Defence. Acting Department of Defence Chief Financial Officer Edem Abotsi informed Parliament’s Standing Committee on Appropriations that the R823 million allocated for the 12‑month deployment of 2,200 SANDF personnel remained unpaid by the end of July. The department had warned the National Treasury twice—on 1 April and 28 May—about the funding requirement and the risks of delay; the Treasury subsequently requested detailed costing information, and the Appropriation Act was only assented to on 14 July, yet the funds had still not been transferred by 5 August. This financial lag raises broader questions about the sustainability of Operation Prosper. The state has committed thousands of soldiers to some of South Africa’s most entrenched security challenges, but the fiscal machinery required to sustain the deployment appears to lag behind political announcements, potentially undermining the operation’s continuity and credibility.
Conclusion: Need for a comprehensive approach
The evidence gathered from Gauteng, the Western Cape, and the Eastern Cape indicates that while SANDF support can produce short‑term calm and visible security presence, it has not succeeded in breaking the entrenched grip of gangs on the country’s most violence‑plagued communities. The persistence of killings, the lived experience of residents who still fear gang control, and the expert analysis linking violence to poverty, unemployment, and governance failures all point to the necessity of a multifaceted strategy. Sustainable solutions must combine effective policing—bolstered detective and crime‑intelligence capacity—with robust socioeconomic programmes that create legitimate jobs, improve housing, and tackle substance abuse. Moreover, meaningful community involvement, transparent oversight, and reliable funding are essential to ensure that military deployments serve as a catalyst rather than a substitute for comprehensive, long‑term state action. Only by addressing the root causes of gang influence can South Africa hope to restore the constitutional rights and safety that its citizens deserve.