Key Takeaways
- Former NASA Administrator Jim Bridenstine doubts the current Artemis lunar‑lander architecture is the most efficient way to return humans to the Moon.
- He contrasts the Apollo program’s “design‑as‑simple‑as‑possible” approach with Artemis, which relies on two separate, refuel‑dependent landers (SpaceX’s Starship and Blue Origin’s Blue Moon).
- Both Starship and Blue Moon have yet to reach orbit; each will need multiple refueling launches—potentially ≥ 15 for Starship—before they can carry astronauts to the lunar surface.
- NASA plans an Artemis 3 low‑Earth‑orbit rehearsal in mid‑to‑late 2027 to test docking with both landers, but only Blue Moon will have a functional crew cabin; Starship will fly with a docking adapter only.
- Development delays for both landers risk slipping the Artemis 4 crewed landing target (currently 2028) and could prompt NASA to revisit its lander selection, especially given competitive pressure from China’s lunar ambitions.
Jim Bridenstine, who led NASA during the Trump administration, expressed his reservations about the agency’s Artemis moon‑lander strategy while appearing on the This Week in Space podcast. He argued that the architecture chosen for Artemis is “extraordinarily complicated” when measured against the Apollo program, which succeeded by keeping systems as simple as possible. “They designed that thing to be as simple as you could possibly make it, and because of that they were able to land on the moon eight years after John F. Kennedy declared that we were doing it,” Bridenstine said, noting that Apollo’s Saturn V launched the command module, service module, and lunar module in a single flight.
In contrast, Artemis relies on the Space Launch System (SLS) to send the Orion spacecraft to lunar orbit, while the crewed landers—SpaceX’s Starship and Blue Origin’s Blue Moon—must be launched separately, rendezvous with Orion, and then be refueled in orbit before descending to the lunar surface. Bridenstine highlighted that this multi‑step process introduces numerous points of failure and adds significant schedule risk. He pointed out that even though SLS suffered years of delays, its inaugural flight performed flawlessly and was crew‑rated from the start, a benchmark the landers have yet to meet.
Both Starship and Blue Moon remain grounded in terms of orbital flight. Neither vehicle has completed a full orbital test, and each must satisfy a battery of qualification milestones—including uncrewed lunar‑landing demonstrations—before NASA can certify them for crewed operations. The NASA Office of Inspector General has estimated that Starship will need at least 15 additional launches to replenish its propellant tanks for a full lunar landing mission, a figure that underscores the logistical burden of the refuel‑dependent concept. Blue Moon faces a similar, though less‑publicized, refueling requirement.
To mitigate risk, NASA has scheduled an Artemis 3 mission slated for mid‑to‑late 2027. This flight will launch Orion and both landers into low‑Earth orbit, giving astronauts roughly two weeks to practice rendezvous and docking procedures. According to the current plan, the crew will be able to transfer into Blue Moon, which will carry a functional crew cabin, while Starship will fly only with a docking adapter—no habitable module—indicating that SpaceX’s vehicle is still behind in development. The outcome of Artemis 3 could influence NASA’s decision about which lander will ultimately conduct the first crewed touchdown on Artemis 4, presently targeted for 2028.
Bridenstine warned that any further delays in lander readiness could jeopardize the entire schedule. “We still don’t have a lander, and without a lander you can’t land on the moon. It’s really that simple, and I worry that over time that’s going to come back and bite us,” he said. He urged the nation to prioritize speed and simplicity, suggesting that whatever approach yields a lander soonest should be pursued, especially as China advances its own lunar ambitions.
In essence, Bridenstine’s critique centers on the belief that the Artemis architecture, with its dual‑lander, refuel‑intensive design, introduces unnecessary complexity compared to the streamlined Apollo model. While the SLS and Orion have demonstrated reliability on its first flight, the landers remain unproven, and their development timelines are tightly coupled to the success of Artemis 3. Unless the landers achieve rapid progress, the agency may need to revisit its contractor selections or adjust mission timelines to avoid missing the 2028 crewed landing goal and losing ground in the emerging lunar race.