Key Takeaways
- U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s upcoming Middle‑East trip aims to reassure Gulf allies that any U.S.–Iran framework agreement will not leave them exposed.
- Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, UAE) suffered repeated missile and drone strikes on energy and commercial sites during the Feb‑initiated U.S.–Israel–Iran conflict, causing billions in economic damage.
- The attacks eroded the perception of the Gulf as a safe haven for travel and foreign investment, heightening feelings of vulnerability among the ruling elites.
- Experts warn that Iran may leverage its ties with the U.S. and its control of the Strait of Hormuz as bargaining chips, further threatening Gulf security.
- Iranian officials have said the Strait of Hormuz will not revert to its pre‑war status as an open international waterway; instead, it will be jointly managed with Oman under any final deal.
- The core challenge for Washington is to balance a durable U.S.–Iran accord with concrete security guarantees for Gulf partners to prevent a power vacuum that a stronger, sanctions‑relieved Iran could exploit.
The visit of U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio to the Middle East is being framed by analysts as a diplomatic effort to “tranquilizar” (reassure) the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states while Washington and Tehran work toward implementing a framework agreement intended to bring a permanent end to the ongoing U.S.–Israel–Iran conflict that erupted in February. According to Benjamin Radd, a senior fellow at UCLA’s Burkle Center for International Relations, the primary goal of Rubio’s engagements will be to convince Gulf leaders that any eventual accord will not leave them “desprotegidos, desprevenidos ni incapaces de lidiar con un Irán futuro.” In other words, the United States seeks to assure its allies that the agreement will incorporate safeguards preventing a resurgent, sanctions‑relieved Iran from posing a heightened threat to Gulf security.
The Gulf states—namely Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates—have been on the front lines of the recent hostilities. Since February, Iranian‑backed forces have launched a series of ballistic‑missile and drone strikes targeting critical energy infrastructure, such as oil refineries, export terminals, and petrochemical plants, as well as commercial hubs including ports and logistics centers. These attacks have inflicted economic losses estimated in the billions of dollars, disrupted oil production and export flows, and forced costly repairs and heightened security spending. Beyond the immediate fiscal toll, the strikes have damaged the Gulf’s reputation as a secure destination for international travel, tourism, and foreign direct investment, prompting investors to reassess risk premiums in the region.
Radd notes that many Gulf officials now feel “desprotegidos” because the attacks demonstrated Iran’s ability to strike deep within their territories despite the presence of U.S. forces and allied defenses. He argues that Iran is simultaneously using its diplomatic channels with the United States as leverage and exploiting its strategic control over the Strait of Hormuz—a narrow waterway through which roughly one‑fifth of the world’s oil passes—to extract concessions. The strait’s status, therefore, has become a focal point of Gulf anxiety: any perception that Tehran could impede or militarize this chokepoint would directly threaten the economic lifelines of the Gulf monarchies.
Iranian officials have repeatedly signaled that, post‑agreement, which rely heavily on unimpeded oil shipments for fiscal stability.
In line with these concerns, Iranian representatives have stated unequivocally that the Strait of Hormuz will not revert to its pre‑war condition as an unrestricted international maritime corridor. Instead, they propose that the waterway be administered jointly with Oman once a definitive U.S.–Iran accord is reached. Such an arrangement would grant Iran a formal role in regulating traffic through the strait, a prospect that Gulf leaders view with alarm because it could enable Tehran to influence—or even disrupt—oil flows at will. The prospect of joint management also raises questions about the future of existing security arrangements, such as the U.S.-led maritime patrols that have historically safeguarded the corridor.
For U.S. policymakers, the challenge lies in crafting a framework agreement that satisfies two competing imperatives: achieving a durable de‑escalation with Iran that curtails its nuclear ambitions and reduces regional provocations, while simultaneously delivering credible, binding security assurances to the Gulf states. The assurances would need to address not only the immediate threat of missile and drone attacks but also the longer‑term strategic concerns surrounding Iran’s economic resurgence post‑sanctions and its potential to wield influence over vital maritime chokepoints. Rubio’s visit, therefore, serves as a conduit for translating these strategic priorities into concrete diplomatic messages, aiming to preserve the cohesion of the U.S.–Gulf partnership amid a shifting regional equilibrium.