Key Takeaways
- Innovation in the French Army is a continuous, two‑track process: bottom‑up unit experimentation and top‑down strategic direction via the Future Combat Command and brigade exploratory hubs.
- Lessons from Ukraine highlight the coexistence of high‑tech (drones, AI, electronic warfare) and low‑tech (trenches, close combat) warfare; the Army avoids treating Ukraine as a single model for future conflict.
- Training now stresses realism, dispersion, friction, and command in degraded environments, validated by the Orion 26 exercise which confirmed the need for lethality, battlefield transparency, C2, and sustainment.
- Critical division‑level capabilities—deep fires, air defense, electronic warfare, logistics, counter‑drone, bridging, and maintenance—are being accelerated, while long‑term assets like heavy logistics and experienced command chains remain hardest to generate quickly.
- Surprise on a transparent battlefield relies on speed, deception, dispersion, electronic warfare, and autonomous systems; restoring operational depth is a priority.
- The Scorpion vehicle program’s increased connectivity risks information overload; AI should simplify decision‑making, preserving the “commanding by intent” philosophy.
- France aims to be a framework nation for European land operations, urging allies to close gaps in industrial coherence, stockpiles, endurance, and shared training habits.
- The Pendragon robotics project shows that future firepower will combine highly protected manned platforms with swarms of autonomous systems operating within a combat‑cloud, system‑of‑systems architecture.
French Army’s Approach to Continuous Innovation
General Pierre Schill describes the current era as one of technological acceleration comparable to the Industrial Revolution or the mechanization of twentieth‑century warfare. He stresses that innovation is not a final state but a permanent adaptation process; operational superiority now depends as much on the ability to learn and evolve quickly as on the equipment itself. To move from experimentation to fielded capability, the Army employs two complementary dynamics: bottom‑up initiative from units responding to real‑world pressures, and top‑down direction set by the Future Combat Command, operational feedback, and capability coherence. Brigade exploratory hubs serve as the connective tissue, turning rapid experiments into concrete capabilities through subsidiarity‑funded acquisition models that accelerate battlefield adaptation.
Avoiding Over‑Learning from Ukraine
While the war in Ukraine provides a wealth of lessons—particularly the rapid spread of drones, electronic warfare, battlefield transparency, AI, and partial automation—Schill warns against treating it as the sole template for future conflict. Ukraine also demonstrates the persistence of “archaic” forms of combat: trenches, door‑to‑door urban fighting, attrition, and close combat remain decisive. The key insight is the superposition of old and new forms of warfare rather than their replacement. France, as a nuclear NATO power with a full‑spectrum military model, must preserve its own coherence across three strategic spaces—homeland protection, overseas operations, and high‑intensity coalition warfare—requiring a versatile, adaptable, and balanced force rather than one overly specialized in a single form of combat.
Training Evolutions Confirmed by Orion 26
Training has shifted toward greater realism, dispersion, and friction. Units now rehearse in contested environments under constant drone threat, electronic jamming, deep strikes, and information overload. Command training has been reinforced for degraded conditions, headquarters protection, mobility, logistic survivability, and combined‑arms coordination. The Orion 26 exercise validated the Army’s transformation plan, affirming that large, coherent formations capable of sustaining command over time, operating in coalition, and maintaining high operational tempos are essential. Orion 26 also highlighted the priority of differentiating capabilities—lethality, battlefield transparency, command and control, and sustainment—with a particular emphasis on deep fires as the cornerstone of future lethality.
Capabilities Needed for a War‑Ready Division by 2027
A modern division’s effectiveness hinges not only on maneuver brigades but on the enablers that allow those brigades to move and fight: deep fires, air defense, electronic warfare, robust command systems, logistics, bridging, mobility, maintenance, and counter‑drone warfare. The French Army is accelerating efforts in exactly these areas, guided by the updated Military Programming Law that focuses on strengthening these differentiating capabilities for divisions and army corps. The most difficult capacities to generate quickly in a crisis are those demanding long‑term preparation—heavy logistics pipelines, experienced command hierarchies, stockpiles of munitions and spares, and specialized technical expertise—underscoring that an army cannot be improvised when shock arrives.
Regaining Surprise on a Transparent Battlefield
Drones and ISR have made the battlefield far more transparent, constraining movement, yet surprise has not vanished; it has changed its nature. On a highly visible battlefield, surprise now stems from speed, deception, dispersion, saturation, and the ability to disrupt the enemy faster than it can adapt. To restore operational maneuver, the Army is investing in stronger electronic warfare, signature reduction, hybridized communications networks, dispersed headquarters, faster decision loops, and autonomous systems able to operate in contested environments. Re‑establishing operational depth—combining drones, robotics, long‑range fires, electronic warfare, and mobility—will recreate opportunities for breakthrough and movement, a central challenge for land warfare in the coming decade.
Scorpion Connectivity: Balancing Technology and Human Limits
The Scorpion vehicle modernization program enhances connectivity but also introduces complexity and the risk of information overload. In degraded environments, both systems and humans can fail: communications may be jammed or saturated, while soldiers can suffer cognitive overload from excessive data. Schill argues that technology should simplify decision‑making rather than complicate it. Artificial intelligence can prioritize information, accelerate routine tasks, and reduce cognitive load, thereby preserving the commander’s ability to decide. Crucially, technology must not create absolute dependency; the principle of “commanding by intent” remains core—commanders set objectives and provide meaning, while initiative belongs to subordinates, especially in dispersed, degraded, and saturated conditions where subsidiarity becomes a condition for effectiveness.
France as a Framework Nation for European Land Defense
Amid U.S. urging for Europeans to assume greater responsibility for their own defense, Schill affirms that France aims to act as a framework nation capable of commanding major European land operations without relying on American enablers or command structures. Europe possesses high‑quality forces, real operational experience, and a strong defense industrial base, but the challenge lies in achieving coherence, responsiveness, and sufficient mass. Rebuilding production capacity, stockpiles, and endurance compatible with today’s strategic realities is essential, as is cultivating shared training habits across allies. France’s ambition is not to replace its partners but to contribute to a stronger, more autonomous Europe capable of shaping its own strategic destiny.
Pendragon, Robotics, and the Future Ground Combat System
The Pendragon project, which develops robotized ground combat vehicles, reshapes expectations for the Main Ground Combat System (MGCS). Recent conflicts have shown that while the tank remains indispensable, it can no longer operate as an isolated platform. Instead, future firepower will emerge from an interconnected combination of manned and unmanned systems. Pendragon illustrates that robotics is not merely an added capability; it transforms the way warfare is conducted by emphasizing the combat cloud, connectivity, and cooperation between systems. The MGCS of the 2030‑2040 decade must therefore be conceived as a system of systems integrated into the broader TITAN environment, pairing highly protected, decision‑capable manned platforms with swarms of autonomous systems that provide mass, sensor coverage, saturation, and attrition. This hybrid approach will define the next generation of armored combat.