Key Takeaways
- Control of the air is no longer a given; it must be fought for and maintained continuously.
- The war in Ukraine demonstrates that neither side can achieve air superiority, turning the conflict into a grinding war of attrition.
- Proliferation of drones, cruise missiles, and integrated air‑defence systems has created a crowded, contested airspace at all altitudes.
- Western militaries, accustomed to uncontested skies against weaker opponents, face a starkly different challenge against near‑peer rivals such as Russia and China.
- Loss of air cover deprives ground forces of firepower, protection, and the ability to mass for breakthroughs, increasing cost, complexity, and casualties.
- Future operations will likely rely on short bursts of air supremacy rather than prolonged dominance, demanding new tactics, training, and mindset.
The Evolving Nature of Air Superiority
Air Vice‑Marshal Ian “Cab” Townsend of the British Royal Air Force emphasized that control of the air is the core duty of any air force, enabling freedom of initiative, maneuver, and operational reach across all domains. Historically, Western powers have enjoyed this advantage, allowing them to project combat power with relative impunity. Townsend warned, however, that this condition is not permanent; air superiority must be earned through relentless effort and sustained every minute of every day. The changing security environment means that the assumption of easy air dominance can no longer be taken for granted, especially when facing adversaries capable of contesting the skies at scale.
Lessons from the Ukraine Conflict
The ongoing war in Ukraine provides a stark illustration of what happens when neither side can secure effective control of the air. Both Ukrainian and Russian forces have been denied unfettered access to the front‑line airspace, resulting in a static, attritional fight marked by high casualties and limited maneuverability. Townsend described the war as a “bitter experience” that reinforces the historical lesson: fighting without air control dramatically increases cost, complexity, and loss of life. The inability to mass armored units or infantry for breakthroughs has forced both sides into a grinding struggle, underscoring the strategic value of air superiority for enabling combined‑arms operations.
The Rise of Drone and Missile Threats
A central factor eroding traditional air dominance is the proliferation of inexpensive drones and advanced missile systems. Townsend noted that over the past decade militaries have shifted from confronting “little green men” on the ground to contending with “little grey drones” in the air. These unmanned systems, paired with integrated air‑missile defence networks, create a layered threat that can operate at low, medium, and high altitudes, complicating detection and engagement. The democratization of air power means that even non‑state actors can challenge sophisticated air forces, while near‑peer states can field dense, overlapping defences that deny uncontested airspace to adversaries.
Implications for Western Military Doctrine
Western armed forces have grown accustomed to fighting weaker opponents where superior air assets could suppress enemy defences and seize the skies with relative ease. Townsend highlighted that this “holiday from history” is over; future conflicts with Russia or China will unfold in highly contested environments where air superiority cannot be assumed. Consequently, doctrines that relied on uninterrupted air support for tank maneuvers, infantry advances, and logistics must be re‑examined. Planners must now account for periods of denied or degraded air access, develop contingency plans for operating under enemy air‑threat envelopes, and invest in capabilities that can survive or suppress sophisticated air defences.
Preparing for Near‑Peer Contested Airspace
To adapt, Western militaries must cultivate a mindset of persistent vigilance toward aerial threats. Maj. Rachel Martin, director of the U.S. Army’s Unmanned Advanced Lethality Course, observed that soldiers have long taken friendly air superiority for granted and must now be taught to be “pessimistic or suspicious” of any airborne contact. Training programs are increasingly integrating counter‑UAS tactics, electronic warfare, and missile‑defence drills to prepare troops for environments where the sky is hostile. Additionally, force structures are exploring distributed operations, dispersed logistics, and resilient command‑and‑control networks that can function even when air support is intermittent or unavailable.
Conclusion: Sustaining Air Control in a New Era
The strategic landscape has shifted from an era of assured air dominance to one where control of the air is contested, fleeting, and hard‑won. Townsend’s assertion that “control of the air is earned” captures the necessity for continuous investment in air‑defence, offensive counter‑air, and resilient joint operations. While short bursts of air supremacy may still be achievable—exploiting windows when enemy defences are depleted or suppressed—sustained dominance will require innovation, adaptive tactics, and a cultural shift that treats the sky as a potentially hostile domain at all times. By internalizing these lessons, Western forces can better prepare for the realities of great‑power competition and preserve the freedom of action that air superiority traditionally provides.