Key Takeaways:
- Artificial intelligence (AI) is becoming increasingly important in national security decision-making, but it also poses a threat to deterrence.
- AI can be used to strengthen deterrence by providing better intelligence, faster assessments, and more consistent decision-making, but it can also be exploited by adversaries to undermine these goals.
- Adversaries can use AI to poison the training data of models, launch AI-enabled influence operations, and manipulate public sentiment, which can limit a state’s ability to maintain credible deterrence.
- To bolster deterrence in the AI age, policymakers, defense planners, and intelligence agencies must reckon with the ways in which AI models can be weaponized and ensure that digital defenses against these threats are keeping pace.
- The outcome of future crises may depend on the ability of states to effectively use AI to strengthen deterrence while preventing its exploitation by adversaries.
Introduction to AI and Deterrence
Artificial intelligence is rapidly becoming indispensable to national security decision-making. As AI systems advance, they promise to reshape how states respond to threats. However, advanced AI platforms also threaten to undermine deterrence, which has long provided the overall basis for U.S. security strategy. Effective deterrence depends on a country being credibly able and willing to impose unacceptable harm on an adversary. As noted in the article, "deterrence hinges on how effectively a country can credibly signal both its capabilities and its willingness to act." AI can strengthen some of the foundations of that credibility, but it can also be exploited by adversaries to undermine these goals.
The Role of AI in Deterrence
On the surface, artificial intelligence appears well suited to strengthen deterrence. By processing vast amounts of data, AI can provide better intelligence, clarify signals, and accelerate leaders’ decisions by producing faster and more comprehensive analyses. For example, in the war in Ukraine, AI tools allow the Ukrainian military to scan satellite and drone images to identify Russian troop and equipment movements, missile sites, and supply routes. As the article states, "AI can reinforce deterrence by ensuring that each side’s actions are clearly communicated to the other." However, AI can also be used to undermine deterrence by manipulating public sentiment and poisoning the training data of models.
The Threat of AI-Enabled Influence Operations
Adversaries can use AI to launch influence operations that manipulate public sentiment and undermine a state’s deterrent credibility. These operations can be used to spread false information, create confusion, and corrode public discourse. As the article notes, "recent advances in data science and generative AI have made influence operations far more potent across three linked areas: target identification, persona creation, and individually tailored content." For instance, a company like GoLaxy can use generative AI tools and vast open-source data sets to build detailed psychological profiles of surveilled individuals and deploy synthetic personas that mimic authentic users.
The Risk of Model Poisoning
Another pathway that adversaries can take to create uncertainty for defenders is model poisoning: the strategic manipulation of the AI systems on which governments rely for intelligence and decision-making support. By corrupting these systems’ training data or compromising their analytical pipelines, adversaries can distort a defender’s understanding of its relative strength and of the urgency of the threat. As the article states, "model poisoning works by manipulating a model’s data pipeline so that it overlooks important information and absorbs false inputs." This can push the system toward misleading or degraded assessments, which can weaken the credibility of a state’s deterrent signals and create dangerous risks.
Getting Out in Front of the Threat
The advent of AI systems was expected to strengthen deterrence by sending clearer signals to adversaries about a defender’s capabilities and resolve. However, the rising use of information warfare driven by those same systems threatens to do the opposite. To counter this threat, governments and researchers must take steps to harden analytic systems against model poisoning and actively counter AI-enabled influence operations whenever they are detected. As the article notes, "strategies for countering this new threat must be developed as rapidly as the technologies underpinning it." This will require a concerted effort from policymakers, defense planners, and intelligence agencies to ensure that digital defenses against these threats are keeping pace.
Conclusion
In the AI era, deterrence can no longer rest on capabilities and resolve alone. It will require leaders, defense strategists, and other decision-makers to be able to preserve the reliability of their information environment, even amid widespread digital distortion. As the article concludes, "the outcome of future crises may depend on it." By understanding the ways in which AI can be used to strengthen and undermine deterrence, states can take steps to mitigate the risks and ensure that their deterrent signals remain credible in the face of emerging threats.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/fog-ai